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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W. MCKnight *
I. STATUS
InformalMarriage. The essential elements of an informal marriage are (1)
an agreement between a man and a woman to be married, (2) their subse-
quent cohabitation as husband and wife, and (3) their representation to the
public that they are married.' In Estate of Claveria v. Claveria2 the Texas
Supreme Court reversed a court of civil appeals decision that held there
was no evidence of an informal marriage.3 The primary issue in Claveria
was the validity of the ceremonial marriage between the alleged surviving
husband and his deceased spouse. In deciding in favor of the validity of
the later ceremonial marriage, the intermediate appellate court found that
there had never been a prior informal marriage. The court began its anal-
ysis by applying the presumption of section 2.01 of the Family Code,4 that
the most recent marriage is valid until one who asserts the continuing va-
lidity of a prior marriage proves its validity. 5 Both parties to the alleged
prior undissolved informal marriage testified that they had not been mar-
ried, but evidence was introduced that they had executed and acknowl-
edged a deed of trust as husband and wife to secure the purchase price of a
house. The alleged husband had also given a deposition in a prior judicial
proceeding in which he stated that he was married to the woman. Thus
the supreme court found two significant instances of public holding out of
a marriage by a cohabiting couple that the court deemed to be direct evi-
dence of the informal marriage, 6 rather than the single instance, referred to
by the lower court, which might have been regarded as a fraudulent mis-
representation. The court also noted that section 1.91(b) of the Family
Code7 allows the agreement to be married to be inferred from such evi-
B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author acknowledges
the assistance of William G. Whitehill and M. Drew Siegel, third year students at Southern
Methodist University, in preparation of this article.
1. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975); see Comment, Common-Law
Marriage in Texas, 21 Sw. L.J. 647, 648 (1967).
2. 615 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1981).
3. Claveria v, Estate of Claveria, 597 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980),
rev'd and remanded, 615 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1981).
4. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1975).
5. 615 S.W.2d at 165.
6. 615 S.W.2d at 167. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision in Red Eagle v. Cannon, 201 Okla. 511, 208 P.2d 557 (1949).
7. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1975) provides that the requisite agree-
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dence.8 Although the parties to the purported informal marriage testified
that they had not agreed to be married, their testimony as to not being
married could have been understood to refer only to a ceremonial mar-
riage. The supreme court further noted that a subsequent ceremonial mar-
riage by an alleged spouse of an undissolved informal marriage tends to
discredit the validity of a purported prior informal marriage. 9 As decided
by the supreme court, the Claveria case plows no new ground.
In another case the court pointed out that a woman's retention of her
former name, instead of that of her alleged husband, and her failure to
change her social security number 10 were not admissions that no informal
marriage existed. " In still another case it was noted that if immediately
after being divorced, former spouses resume living together in the same
manner as they did during their previous marriage, such actions are evi-
dence of an agreement to be informally married.' 2 Even though the testi-
mony of a purported party to an informal marriage concerning the alleged
agreement to be informally married is otherwise inadmissible because of
the dead man's statute, the testimony becomes admissible when that testi-
mony is elicited by the opposite party.' 3 The existence of the informal
marriage must be established only by a preponderance of the evidence,
and once it is established, the spouse's rights are, in all respects, exactly the
same as if there had been a formal marriage.15 Therefore, a surviving
spouse of an informal marriage is entitled to the same share of the commu-
nity estate in intestate succession as the surviving spouse of a ceremonial
marriage would receive. 16 Moreover, once an informal marriage comes
into existence, it may be terminated only by the same means as a formal
marriage may be terminated, that is, by death or court decree.17 Subse-
quent denials of the marriage by spouses of an informal marriage can not
constitute a "common law divorce" of that marriage.' 8
In Franklin v. Smalldridge a purported informal marriage was deemed
invalid due to a prior, undissolved, Mexican, ceremonial marriage.' 9 The
ment to be married may be inferred if it is established that the man and woman lived to-
gether as husband and wife and represented to others that they were married.
8. 615 S.W.2d at 167. The court remanded the case to the court of civil appeals to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence to establish an informal marriage. Id. at 168.
9. Id. at 166.
10. Such retention is not dispositive of the common law marriage issue. See Mcllveen
v. Mcllveen, 332 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, no writ).
11. In re Glasco, 619 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
The alleged wife's failure to adopt the husband's surname, however, may be some evidence
to refute an agreement to be married. See Drummond v. Benson, 133 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939, writ ref'd).
12. See Smith v. Smith, 607 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
13. Id. at 621.
14. 619 S.W.2d at 571.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1981).
18. Id.
19. 616 S.W.2d 655, 657-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ). The court
noted that the plaintiff had established all of the elements of a valid informal marriage in
Texas except for the removal of the impediment of a prior undissolved marriage. Id. at 657.
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alleged wife of the informal marriage brought suit seeking a divorce and to
set aside the conveyance of alleged community property without her join-
der. The trial court adjudged that there was no marriage to dissolve. On
appeal the plaintiff contended that the grantee of the property had failed to
prove the continued validity of the prior marriage. 20 Ordinarily, the party
relying on the validity of the prior marriage has the burden to plead and
prove its validity, 2' but in Franklin the plaintiff admitted the existence of
the previous marriage and the lack of a divorce to dissolve it. Although
the prior marriage might nonetheless have been dissolved by the death of
the other party, the court of civil appeals held that, due to the plaintiff's
admission, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove the absence of the
impediment to the subsequent informal marriage.22 The court was mis-
taken in this conclusion. The burden of showing the impediment to the
later marriage remained on the party asserting the continued existence of
the prior marriage. 23 Under section 2.01 of the Family Code it was incum-
bent on the defendants to prove that the husband of the first marriage
remained alive during the whole of the second marriage.24
Entering Into Marriage. In Penna- Urrutia v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service25 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a sham
marriage entered into for the purpose of avoiding federal immigration
laws. A foreign man and an American woman voluntarily agreed to be
and were ceremonially married under Nevada law, but the purpose of the
ceremony was avoidance of the man's deportation. The couple never lived
together or had sexual relations. The court held that their lack of intent to
establish a life together resulted in merely a sham marriage, and the de-
fendant was therefore deportable. 26 The validity of the marriage for pur-
poses of state law was not addressed in the case, but it can also be
concluded that the ceremonial marriage was invalid under state law. 27
As a general rule parties to a divorce cannot marry within thirty days
following the date of divorce unless they remarry each other.28 The thirty-
day period begins when the divorce becomes effective. 29 In Galbraith v.
A prior undissolved marriage is clearly an impediment to a subsequent formal marriage as
well as a subsequent informal marriage. See Comment, supra note 1, at 655.
20. During the pendency of the trial the husband died and the divorce action was dis-
missed. 616 S.W.2d at 656.
21. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1975); Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615
S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex. 1981); In re R. L. & S. M. L., 622 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
22. 616 S.W.2d at 657.
23. See Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1981).
24. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1975).
25. 640 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 244-45.
27. An example of an issue that may arise in this context is whether an alien spouse has
any property rights upon the death of a Texas spouse in any of the property that would be
the Texas spouse's separate property but for the marriage.
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.66 (Vernon 1975).




Galbraith the court of civil appeals concluded that the divorce became ef-
fective when a non-interlocutory oral pronouncement of divorce was made
by the trial court. 30 A marriage within the thirty-day period is voidable
unless the party seeking the annulment knows, or a reasonably prudent
person would have known, of the prior divorce. 31
Separation. The court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Koch32 considered a
group life insurance contract that afforded coverage for the husband-em-
ployee's life and included coverage for his wife's life unless they were judi-
cially separated. The husband and wife were living separately pursuant to
a temporary order in a pending divorce suit. The temporary order divided
much of their property and provided for the payment of their debts. Sub-
sequently, the wife died and the insurance company brought suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the wife's death was not covered by the policy
because, at the time of her death, the couple was separated within the
terms of the policy. The court held that Texas does not recognize the con-
cept of legal separation and construed the phrase "legally separated or di-
vorced" to require a final judgment. 33
Interspousal Torts. Texas law has recognized the concept of interspousal
tort immunity among spouses in negligence and negligent wrongful death
actions.34 In Byrd v. Byrd, however, the Fourth Circuit held that inter-
spousal tort immunity does not apply within the federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion.35 The plaintiff wife brought suit against her husband to recover for
her injuries sustained while in navigable waters due to her husband's neg-
ligent maintenance of a pleasure craft. In this question of first impression
the court overruled the application of Virginia law providing for inter-
spousal immunity.36 The court reasoned that because admiralty law pro-
vides that the negligent operation of a vessel creates a federal right of
recovery for all those who receive injuries therefrom, 37 the application of
interspousal immunity would defeat the plaintiffs established federal right
of recovery.38 Moreover, the court determined that the establishment of a
federal rule concerning interspousal immunity for all admiralty cases
rather than the application of the widely divergent state laws in individual
cases, would promote the goal of uniform admiralty law.39 The Fourth
30. Id.
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.46 (Vernon 1975); 619 S.W.2d at 240.
32. 617 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Id. at 788.
34. See Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980); Bounds v. Cau-
die, 611 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Bruno v.
Bruno, 589 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). This doctrine does
not, however, apply to intentional torts. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977);
Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 938-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
35. 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981).
36. Id.
37. See St. Heloise Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 980-81 (8th Cir. 1974).
38. 657 F.2d at 618, 620.
39. Id. at 618.
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Circuit, however, distinguished situations in which local law is applied in
admiralty cases because the local law involves a set of intricate and interre-
lated rules that Congress has not specifically chosen to preempt.40 The
rules concerning interspousal immunity, however, were not as intricate
and interrelated as the laws of familial status and insurance contracts, and
therefore, deference to local law was not required on the issue of inter-
spousal immunity. 41
Persons Entitled to Conduct Marriage Ceremonies. In 1981 the legislature
once again snubbed Texas municipal judges. Section 1.83 of the Family
Code, enumerating persons authorized to conduct marriage ceremonies,
was amended to include federal magistrates.42 Municipal judges remain
conspicuously absent from the list of qualified officiants. Are municipal
judges less worthy than other types of judges to preside over the formal
institution of marriage because of their predominantly revenue-collecting
function of adjudicating motor vehicle violations? These judges should be
added to the list of those authorized to perform marriage ceremonies.
Interspousal Testimony. In Exparte Le Blanc43 a wife testified against her
husband during a hearing to rescind an order allowing bond pending ap-
peal. The wife testified that she had been beaten by her husband and her
mother testified that she overheard the husband threaten to kill his wife.
Finding that the husband would be likely to commit another offense if
released, the trial court" rescinded the bail. Although in a criminal case a
spouse may voluntarily testify against the other spouse only in cases in-
volving an assault45 committed by one spouse against the other or against
a child under sixteen of either spouse, 46 the court did not commit error in
hearing the wife's testimony because the judge, sitting without a jury, is
presumed to have disregarded the testimony if it was inadmissible.47
Moreover, the mother's testimony was sufficient to establish that the hus-
band was likely to commit another crime while on bail.48 A spouse may
testify, however, as to communications made between the spouses during
marriage if a third person was present during the conversation, because
those statements are not privileged statements under article 38.11. 4 9 If a
couple is divorced before the trial, article 38.11 is not applicable, and a
former spouse is competent to testify against the other former spouse.50
40. Id. at 619-20.
41. Id. at 620.
42. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.83 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
43. 615 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
44. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
45. The question whether an assult is in issue within article 38.11 is determined by the
circumstances of the particular case and not by the allegations. Nelson v. State, 612 S.W.2d
605, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
46. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979).
47. 615 S.W.2d at 726.
48. Id.
49. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979).
50. Bear v. State, 612 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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An Iowa federal district court in Vance v. Rice5' addressed the issue of
whether the state could prevent a defendant and a pregnant material wit-
ness to a major crime from marrying and thus invoke the state's spousal-
incompetence statute52 to bar the witness's testimony. The court recog-
nized that although there was a fundamental right to marry, 53 the right
may be subject to state regulation in appropriate circumstances. 54 The
court stated that the policy of preserving marital harmony would not pre-
vail over the state's interest in presenting highly relevant evidence in a
serious criminal trial if the prospective spouses were not yet married."5
Further, the court stated that the state's actions advanced the state's legiti-
mate and compelling interest in preserving the availability of this evi-
dence. 56 Because the accused refused the state's proposal to solve the
problem by allowing the couple to marry if the accused would stipulate
that the witness's deposition would be admissible at trial and there were no
other viable alternatives of resolving the evidentiary problems, the court
found that the state's action was the least intrusive means available to ac-
commodate the state's compelling interest. 57 The court therefore ruled
that the state's action in prohibiting the marriage was constitutional. 58
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
AntenuptialAgreements and Spousal Partitions. The most significant devel-
opment in this area of the law during this survey period was the enactment
of legislation implementing the November 1980 constitutional amend-
ment.5 9 In general language sections 5.41 and 5.42 of the Family Code
authorize bilateral partition or exchange by antenuptial agreement, 60 mari-
tal partition 61 or exchange 62 of both existing community property or that
to be acquired in the future.
63
51. 524 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
52. IowA CODE ANN. § 622.7 (West 1950).
53. See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
54. 524 F. Supp. at 1299 (citing a dictum in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386
(1978)).
55. 524 F. Supp. at 1300.
56. Id. at 1301.
57. Id. at 1302.
58. Id.
59. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. For a further discussion of article XVI, § 15, as
amended, see McKnight, Family Law.: Husband and Wife, 35 Sw. L.J. 93, 98-102 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as McKnight, 1981 Survey]; McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wfe,
34 Sw. L.J. 115, 119-20 (1980) [hereinafater cited as McKnight, 1980 Survey].
60. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.41 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
61. Id. § 5.42.
62. Id. A spousal partition may serve the function of a property settlement agreement
in anticipation of divorce and may be presented to the court as a prerequisite to its full
effectiveness for approval as fair and just. See Morgan v. Morgan, 622 S.W.2d 447, 449-50
(Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
63. The ability to partition or exchange property to be acquired in the future represents
a significant change from the old law. See McKnight, 1981 Survey, supra note 59, at 114.
Franzina v. Estate of Franzina, 618 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1981, writ
refd n.r.e.), is illustrative of the proposition that spouses could not agree to establish the
[Vol. 36
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Section 5.41 is designed to allow spouses to enter into antenuptial agree-
ments and is phrased in terms of marital property agreements. 64 Counsel
who draft such agreements should nonetheless take care to track the lan-
guage of the constitution which, in describing antenuptial transactions, re-
fers only to the process of partition. 65  Section 5.43 reflects the
constitutional distinction permitting spouses to agree in writing that all of
the future income or property derived from the separate property then
owned or to be acquired in the future by only one of them shall be the
separate property of that spouse. 66 Section 5.44, requiring all agreements
and partitions to be in writing and signed by all parties, applies to ante-
nuptial agreements, spousal partitions, and spousal agreements 67 and does
not change the existing law.
The scope of allowed transactions is slightly different for antenuptial
agreements and spousal partitions in several instances. Because separate
property interests are all that are being dealt with in the case of antenuptial
agreements, a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in property that
would otherwise be community property should be capable of creation
without any problem. The constitution, however, does not authorize an
antenuptial agreement providing merely that income from the separate
property of only one spouse will be that spouse's separate property.68 Such
a result can only be achieved as part of a bilateral antenuptial partition.
Section 5.4569 is an addition to the Family Code and represents a signifi-
cant change in the existing law. Under this section when the validity of
any provision of an antenuptial agreement, spousal partition or exchange
is challenged, the party relying on its validity has the burden of proof in
rebutting any fraud in the agreement.70 The proponent must "prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom enforcement of
the agreement is sought gave informed consent and that the agreement was
not procurred by fraud, duress, or overreaching." '7' Because these issues
character of property yet to be acquired. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 870
(Tex. 1978); Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. 1964); Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d
855, 858 (Tex. Comm'n App.-1933, judgm't adopted). All of these decisions were decided
under the old provision that did not allow the partition or exchange of property to be ac-
quired in the future. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
64. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.41 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
65. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
66. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.43 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
67. Id. § 5.44. See also Tatum v. Tatum, 606 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ). The husband orally agreed before marriage that if the other spouse
would marry him and take care of him until death, he would leave all of his property to her
upon his death. They subsequently executed a joint will, but prior to his death, the deceased
spouse revoked that will and executed a different one naming others as his beneficiaries.
The court of civil appeals held that oral contracts made in consideration of marriage were
unenforceable, and that the rendition of promised services was not sufficient part perform-
ance to take the oral contract out of the statute of frauds. Id.
68. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
70. Id. To the extent that such an agreement is being offered to rebut the community
property presumption, the offering party already has the initial burden to produce and au-
thenticate evidence of the agreement. See notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
71. TEX. FAM. CODE AtN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1982). For a discussion of§ 5.45, see
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are normally plead as affirmative defenses, 72 this section runs contrary to
the general rule that the party relying on an affirmative defense has the
burden of pleading and proof on that issue.73
Prior to the 1980 constitutional amendment, preexisting creditor's rights
in community property were widely regarded as not being affected by a
partition of that property.74 Section 5.46 reflects the changed constitu-
tional position by recognizing preexisting creditor's rights in former com-
munity property that has been partitioned only if the partition was carried
out with the intention to defraud such creditors. 75 This may denote a sig-
nificant change in the law. However, the provision does not specifically
extend to cases when the spouse's community property is partitioned
merely by a decree of divorce. 76 Thus, the safest way to protect the non-
debtor spouse is to have the spouses, in good faith without the intent to
defraud any preexisting creditors, execute a pre-divorce partition of the
community property. 77
Under Texas law it has become axiomatic that spouses cannot convert
community property into property held as joint tenants with rights of sur-
vivorship without first converting it into separate property.78 This require-
ment was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas in Maples v.
NimIz. 79 The case involved a dispute over the ownership of funds in a
savings and loan account after the successive deaths of both spouses. The
bank agreement, purporting to create a joint account with a right of survi-
vorship, was initially funded with presumptively community property.
The deposit agreement made no reference to a partition of community
property. Both spouses had children of previous marriages but no children
of their marriage. The wife died in 1977 and the husband died one year
later. Relying on article 852a, section 6.09 of the Savings and Loan Act,80
the executor of the husband's estate argued that the account agreement
was sufficient to effectuate a valid one-step partition and creation of joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship, thereby entitling the husband's es-
Brink, I Do... I Do? Spouses Face New Choices Afler Constitutional Amendment Concern-
ing Marital Property Agreements, 20 ST. B. NEWSLETTER REAL EST., PROB. & TR. L. 26, 27(181).
72. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
73. See Neuhaus v. Kain, 557 S.W.2d 125, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977,
no writ). See also Rich v. McMullan, 506 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ refd n.r.e.); Navarro v. Secret Harbor Farms, Inc., 506 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
74. Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston, 598 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
75. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.46 (Vernon Supp. 1982). This comports with the fraudu-
lent transfer provisions of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE §§ 24.02, 24.03 (Vernon 1968).
76. Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston, 598 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio), writ re/d n.r.e. per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
77. See McKnight, 1981 Survey, supra note 59, at 114.
78. Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981); Williams, v. McKnight, 402
S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 579, 342 S.W.2d 565, 571 (1961);
see McKnight, 1981 Survey, supra note 59, at 110.
79. 615 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1981).
80. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 6.09 (Vernon 1964).
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tate to all of the funds remaining in the account. Article 852a, section 6.09
provides that spouses may enter into a contract involving a savings ac-
count consisting of community funds under which those funds plus all fu-
ture additions to them will be held as a joint tenancy with a right of
survivorship, and such a contract will be considered as a partition of their
community funds. 81 The court of civil appeals held that the agreement and
the statute were insufficient to satisfy the requirement laid down in Hilley
v. Hilley82 and Williams v. McKnight 83 that the parties should first parti-
tion their community property into shares of separate property before re-
joining it as property to be held in joint tenancy with a right of
survivorship.8 4 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the lower appellate
court in concluding that the execution of the agreement under the author-
ity of article 852a, section 6.09 was not sufficient to accomplish a one-step
partition of community funds and their effective rejoinder. 85 The court
reasoned that the statutory partition provision was merely a fictional parti-
tion similar to those rejected by the court in Hilley and Williams."6 Fur-
ther, the court noted that the agreement itself made no reference to a
partition.87
Section 46 of the Probate Code was amended by the legislature in 1981
to permit spouses to agree with financial institutions that funds on deposit
with that institution "shall by that agreement be partitioned into separate
property and may further provide that the property partitioned by that
agreement be held in joint tenancies and pass by right of survivorship. ' '88
One commentator has suggested that the language of the constitutional
amendment alone, applied to the facts of Maples, would not be enough to
uphold the agreement in that case. 89 Arguably now, if an agreement con-
tains language consistent with that of section 46(b), the agreement will be
upheld as a valid one-step partition agreement. 90 Although this result is
appealing since it would simplify the manner in which spouses can agree
to deal with their property,91 it is uncertain that section 46(b) will with-
stand a constitutional challenge. It is still uncomfortably true that an ac-
count card merely reciting a partition of community property and an
agreement to create a joint tenancy of funds deposited and any additions
thereto are not any less fictitious partitions than those rejected in Maples,
Williams, and Hilley. A far more efficacious procedure is to add a step in
81. Id.
82. 161 Tex. 569, 579, 342 S.W.2d 565, 571 (1961).
83. 402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966).
84. Maples v. Nimitz, 610 S.W.2d 794, 797-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980).
85. 615 S.W.2d at 695.
86. Id. at 694-95.
87. Id. at 695.
88. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
89. See McLaughlin, Joint Accounts, Totten Trusts, and the Poor Man's Will, 44 TEX.
B.J. 871, 873 (1981).
90. Id. at 873.
91. Providing spouses with greater latitude in dealing with their marital property was
one of the principal purposes of the constitutional amendment. See McKnight, 1981 Survey,
supra note 59, at 110.
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the deposit process to achieve a two-step partition in the creation of a joint
tenancy. If there are two separately subscribed agreements, one declaring
a partition and a second creating the joint tenancy,92 the objective can be
easily achieved.
In Maples the Supreme Court of Texas noted that the constitutional
amendment was already approved by the voters but was inapplicable to
the facts of the case before it.93 Assuming that section 46(b) provides a
constitutionally permissible means of achieving a one-step partition-crea-
tion process, one should note that such partition only applies to funds or
securities on deposit. 94 Static property such as real property and securities
issued to an owner are covered only by section 46(a)95 that stands un-
changed. Clearly the two-step process is still required before items of
static property can be converted from community property to property
held as joint tenants with a right of survivorship.
Assuming that both section 46(b) of the Probate Code and section 5.45
of the Family Code are constitutional, the question to consider is whether
the latter has any bearing on the former, i.e. whether the new provision
with respect to burden of proof to rebut fraud has any impact on the crea-
tion of joint tenancy deposits. Although section 5.45 refers to partitions
made under "this subchapter," one wonders how the partition between
spouses can be made as the first step in a joint tenancy deposit without
compliance with the requirements of that subchapter unless a different
process is to be inferred from the enactment of section 46(b) of the Probate
Code.
Commingling and Tracing. In determining the character of property ac-
quired during marriage the community property presumption provides the
initial point of departure. 96 This presumption can be rebutted by proving
that the property was acquired before the marriage, that it was acquired
either by gift or inheritance during the marriage, or that it can be traced to
any of those types of property.97 The party seeking to rebut the commu-
nity presumption has the burden of proof.98 Special problems arise when
separate property funds are deposited in a joint account containing com-
munity assets. If the funds are so commingled that their proper identity is
impossible to determine, the community presumption prevails. 99 In sev-
92. See McLaughlin, supra note 89, at 873.
93. 615 S.W.2d at 693 n.3.
94. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
95. Id. § 46(a).
96. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
97. See McKnight, 1981 Survey, supra note 59, at 103. The character of property as
separate or community is fixed at the time of its acquisition. Villarreal v. Villarreal, 618
S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
98. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1975); Horlock v. Horlock,
614 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); In re
York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); Purser v. Purser, 604
S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
99. McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973); Latham v. Allison, 560
S.W.2d 481, 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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eral instances, however, the courts have allowed a liberal application of the
tracing rules to accounts of this type by application of the identical sum
inference or the family purpose doctrine to withdrawals.100 In Gibson v.
Gibson 11 the proceeds from the sale of the husband's separate property
were deposited into a joint account containing an unspecified amount of
community funds. Subsequently the couple used funds from the account
to purchase a house. This house was later sold and the proceeds were
placed in the account. A car and a second house were then purchased
using funds from the same joint account. On divorce a dispute arose over
the character of the car and the house. The court of civil appeals reversed
the trial court's determination that this property was the husband's sepa-
rate property. 0 2 Because there was no evidence of the amount of commu-
nity funds in the account at the time the separate funds were deposited,10 3
the husband failed to identify his separate funds in the account on his
initial deposit, apart from later transactions. 1 4
Tracing the extent of separate property in an account upon the dissolu-
tion of the marriage is an easier task when the account contains only the
separate funds of one of the spouses before the marriage and that spouse
can establish the balance in the account as of the date of marriage. In
Snider v. Snider 10 5 the husband, prior to the marriage, deposited separate
funds in a savings account containing his funds only. Shortly after the
marriage, but before any deposits were made or interest was posted, with-
drawals were made bringing the balance down to $19,642. After that time
various transactions in the account took place but the balance never went
below $19,642. Later an additional $10,000 of his separate funds were de-
posited in the account. From that time until he died the balance in the
account never went below $29,642. All of this was shown by his bank
book that was introduced into evidence. The court held that this was suffi-
cient tracing to establish the husband's separate property interest in the
account in the amount of $29,642.10 6 The court applied the same analysis
to an outstanding debt owed to the husband by a closely-held corpora-
tion.'0 7 The balance of funds on hand on the corporate books never
dropped below the amount that was shown to have been due to him on the
date of marriage. The court also held that dividends on the husband's
separate stock in his corporation that were declared and distributed to the
successors in title to the stock after the dissolution of the community were
100. See Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.); Sibley v. Sibley, 286 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
dism'd.).
101. 614 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
102. Id. at 489.
103. The court's opinion focused on the second deposit, but there was also little evidence
of the amount of community funds in the account at the initial deposit. Id. at 490.
104. 1d; see Snider v. Snider, 613 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
105. 613 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).




not part of the community estate. 10 8 The court so held despite the fact that
the directors of the corporation, for tax purposes, stated that the dividends
were for the period of time in which the community estate was in
existence. ' 09
In Vallone v. ValloneI10 the husband received a gift from his father con-
sisting of business assets worth $9,365. Shortly thereafter these assets,
along with others for a combined total of $19,663, were transferred to a
corporation in exchange for all of its capital stock. The separate assets
constituted approximately forty-seven percent of the assets shown to have
been transferred to the corporation for stock. On divorce the trial court
valued the entire amount of the stock at $1,000,000 and determined that
forty-seven percent of the stock was the husband's separate property. The
court of civil appeals noted that if the assets were initially received as a
gift, the stock received in exchange for these assets would be the husband's
separate property. '1  The wife argued that the husband had failed to
prove specifically which assets were received as a gift, that the same assets
were transferred to the corporation, the value of the assets, and the exact
proportion of stock received for them. The court rejected this onerous bur-
den and stated that the husband had to show merely that his separate
property had been transferred for a certain portion of the corporation's
stock and that he continued to hold the stock until the time of divorce."
2
More difficult problems arise when a divorce court attempts to deal with
business or professional goodwill. Clearly when an ongoing business or
professional practice is involved and the goodwill is the result of an indi-
vidual's own particular skills and abilities and is so associated with him as
an individual that it would not exist without him, such goodwill is not
property that is divisible." 13 If on the other hand, the goodwill attaches to
the business or practice independent of the individual, however, it is divisi-
ble."r14 Somewhat different considerations are involved when a business or
a practice is sold." 5 In that case the proceeds from the sale, including
those attributable to goodwill, are presumed to be community property."l
6
The party claiming a portion of the such proceeds as his separate property
must show the value of the goodwill, if any, that was acquired before mar-
riage or the value of a noncompetition clause.' 17
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id.
110. 618 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
111. Id. at 822.
112. Id. at 822-23. In In re York, 613 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no
writ), the court, faced with a similar situation, without articulating the extent of the hus-
band's burden of proof, appears to have adopted an assets-to-portion-of-stock test without
requiring a showing of the exact amount of assets involved. Id. at 770.
113. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 763-64 (Tex. 1972).
114. Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427, 435-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, writ dism'd.).
115. See Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
116. Austin v. Austin, 619 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
117. Id; see Dillion v. Anderson, 358 S.W.2d 694, 695-96 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962,
writ refd n.r.e.).
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The bifurcated characterization of personal injury recoveries is well es-
tablished. Compensation for injuries to the body (not measured by loss of
earning power) and pain and suffering are the separate property of the
injured spouse; recovery for medical expenses contracted for as commu-
nity obligations and loss of earning capacity are community property.l" 8
In Huls v. Huls,119 a divorce case, the couple had previously received funds
in settlement of a suit to recover for the personal injuries of the wife. In
the personal injury proceeding recovery had been sought for certain
amounts that would have been the wife's separate property and others that
would have been community property. The settlement was for an amount
significantly below the amounts sought, and the settlement agreement
failed to recite any allocation of the proceeds for the various items of dam-
ages plead. In an appeal taken from the division of property on divorce in
which the funds received from the tort action and their alleged mutations
were not treated as the wife's separate property, the court noted that it
could not assume that the amounts received in settlement were propor-
tional to the amounts prayed for and therefore affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that securities purchased with the proceeds of the settlement
were a mixture of community and separate property of the wife. 120 The
court also rejected the wife's argument that the husband's intention to
make a gift of his one half community interest to her was established be-
cause the account in which the securities were held was in her name only
and because the bank kept separate ledgers for the interest and dividends
from the securities she had and for the proceeds of the sale of such securi-
ties.' 21 The court stated that establishing the account in her name did not
have the same effect as in cases involving the purchase of land. 22 Further-
more, although the keeping of separate ledgers may have been sufficient to
satisfy the tracing requirements if all of the initial funds had been separate
property, here the settlement proceeds and the securities subsequently
bought with them were a commingled mass of community and separate
property. The maintenance of separate ledgers without further proof that
the separate accounting procedures were followed for all of this account's
transactions failed to establish an intent by the husband to make a gift of
his community interest.' 23
Retirement Benefits. The United States Supreme Court in McCarty v. Mc-
Carty held that military retirement benefits cannot be divided on divorce
pursuant to state community property law.124 The Court stated that such a
118. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).
119. 616 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
120. Id. at 315-16.
•121. Id. at 316.
122. Id; see Purser v. Purser, 604 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no
writ) (recital of both spouses' names as grantees raises presumption of gift of one-half inter-
est when property is paid for with husband's separate property).
123. 616 S.W.2d at 316.
124. 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2743, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 608 (1981). The court applied a two part
analysis in deciding whether state community property law was preempted: the asserted
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division was inconsistent with Congress' expressed intent that the pen-
sioner receive all the benefits provided. 125 Moreover, the Court found that
division of the benefits on divorce would be injurious to the objectives of
federal programs by disrupting (1) the system of providing an optional
annuity for a surviving spouse and dependent children 126 and (2) the mili-
tary's personnel management scheme designed to create "'youthful and
vigorous' military forces."' 127 The Court noted that these statutory benefits
do "not embody even a limited 'community property concept.' "128 Once
again the Supreme Court chose to look at division of federal benefits from
the point of view of congressional intent rather than examining their char-
acter as earnings as the Texas courts have analyzed them.' 29
Recognizing that the conclusion in McCarty was dispositive of the issue,
Texas appellate courts have since held that the nonpensioner spouse is not
entitled to any part of the other spouse's military retirement benefits upon
divorce.130 Because these benefits are not divisible on divorce and termi-
nate on death of the retiree, their treatment on divorce may be analogized
to that of separate property.' 3 '
Texas courts had previously established that Veterans Administration
benefits are not community property.' 32 This is so even if the recipient
was receiving benefits that were community property prior to divorce and
following divorce elected to receive the Veterans Administration benefits
instead. 133 The result was deemed the same regardless of whether the elec-
tion was made before134 or after the divorce. 135 The rationale for aliowing
community property interest must conflict with the express terms of the statute and such a
conflict must sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program so as to require the
nonrecognition of the state law. Id. at 2735, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 598. This approach was also
articulated in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (federal railroad retirement
benefits are not divisible on divorce). Texas courts had previously held that military retire-
ment benefits were community property subject to division on divorce. See Trahan v. Tra-
han, 609 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980), rev'd, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.
1981); Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. 1977); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d
661, 663 (Tex. 1976).
125. 101 S. Ct. at 2739, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 603.
126. Id. at 2741, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 606. Although the benefits usually terminate at the
retiree's death, there are two separate plans under which the retiree can take reduced pay
and provide an annuity for a surviving spouse or dependent children. See 10 U.S.C.
1434, 1450 (Supp. III 1979).
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2742, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 606-07. The Court noted that the military retire-
ment program has always been designed as a personnel management device. See id. at 2731,
69 L. Ed. 2d at 593.
128. Id. at 2737, 69 L. Ed. at 601.
129. See also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
130. See, e.g., Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981); Mattern v. Mattern, 624
S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ); Jeffrey v. Kendrick, 621 S.W.2d 207
(Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); Powell v. Powell, 620 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Ct. App.-
Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
132. See Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. 1981); Exparte Pummill, 606
S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1980); Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453,
455 (Tex. 1979); McKnight, 1980 Survey, supra note 59, at 122-23.
133. Exparte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex. 1981).
134. Exparte Pummill, 606 S.W.2d 707, 708-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no
writ).
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such an election was that federal law preempts the area and that a state
court cannot prevent a recipient from choosing federal benefits that are
protected from division on divorce.136 Conversely, if a recipient is receiv-
ing nondivisible benefits, he cannot be required to change those for other
benefits that are divisible.137 On the other hand Texas appellate courts
have found McCarty no barrier to treating either federal civil service re-
tirement benefits' 38 or federal worker's compensation benefits taken in lieu
of civil service retirement benefits as community property.
39
Although retirement benefits arising from employment by the state are
clearly community property, some confusion exists as to the proper proce-
dure for dividing such benefits upon divorce, A division of such benefits
may be made by court order if the funds are currently payable at the time
of the divorce.140 In Wilson v. Teacher Retirement System, however, the
court struck down portions of a settlement agreement incorporated in a
divorce decree that purported to make an immediate assignment of the
husband's unvested interest in a retirement fund to the wife and instructed
the trustees of the fund to make payments directly to the wife as the pen-
sion became payable. 4 The court noted that such settlement agreements
were in the nature of contracts, and that the parties could not agree to
accomplish a result that was forbidden under the statute 42 that prohibited
the assignment or alienation of the benefits. 143 The court distinguished
Teacher Retirement System v. Neil144 and Coiida v. Collida145 as cases of a
court-ordered division of funds that were payable at the time of the de-
cree.146 In so ruling, the court overlooked the conclusion of the Supreme
Court of Texas in McCray v. McCray that terms of a settlement contract
incorporated in a decree have the same force as terms of a decree in the
absence of a settlement. The former terms, therefore, lose their contractual
character when they are incorporated in a decree. 147 The court in Wilson
also ignored the analysis in Collida that recognized that the wife was not
the type of assignee from whom the statutory anti-alientation provisions
135. 615 S.W.2d at 196.
136. Id.
137. Bonar v. Bonar, 614 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
138. Adams v. Adams, 623 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ). For
an earlier conclusion to the same effect, see Cowan v. Plask, 592 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
139. Anthony v. Anthony, 624 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
140. Teacher Retirement Sys. v. Neill, 563 S.W.2d 873, (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Collida v. Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977,
writ dism'd).
141. 617 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
142. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 3.07 (Vernon 1972) (anti-alienation provision).
143. 617 S.W.2d at 331-32. See generally Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex.
1967); Firestone v. Firestone, 567 S.W.2d 889, 891 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
144. 563 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
145. 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ dism'd).
146. 617 S.W.2d at 332.
147. 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979). See also Exparte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844
(Tex. 1979).
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were designed to shield the benefits.' 48 The two cases are better distin-
guished by the fact that the issue of assignability was not raised in Coiida.
The court did not express any opinion as to the validity of an alternative
provision of the agreement declaring the husband as trustee for the benefit
of the wife of any of the funds that he might receive.
Private pension plan benefits are clearly community property.' 49 Bank-
ston v. Taft 150 addressed the issue of whether a former employer's substitu-
tion of a new plan in the place of a plan existing at the time of the divorce
terminates the non-employee ex-spouse's continuing right to share in the
pensioner's benefits. The wife brought suit to partition the husband's re-
tirement benefits that were not dealt with in the decree of divorce. The
husband argued that the plan under which he currently was receiving ben-
efits was a different plan from that which existed at the time of divorce
and, therefore, the wife was not entitled to any benefits from it. In the
alternative, he asserted that she was entitled to share only to the extent that
she could have done so if the ex-husband had been retired at the time of
their divorce. The court rejected both arguments and concluded that the
wife's interest was based on the amount of benefits actually received after
the husband retired.' 51
Loss of Consortium. In Whittlesey v. Miller the Texas Supreme Court held
that if either spouse was injured through the negligence of a third person,
the other spouse had a cause of action against that person for his or her
deprivation of consortium with the impaired spouse.152 The court in Whit-
tilesey noted, however, that loss of consortium in Texas does not include
deprivation of usual household responsibilities by the impaired spouse.'
53
Although loss of consortium is a derivative action because it requires an
injury to the impaired spouse before the deprived spouse has a cause of
action, ' 54 the deprived spouse's cause of action is a separate and independ-
ent cause of action from the impaired spouse's claim for personal inju-
ries. 155 If the impaired spouse's claim is defeated, then the deprived
spouse's cause of action is similarly defeated. 5 6 On the other hand, if both
actions are successful, a double recovery for the same injury does not re-
suit. '57 InAmerican Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez the United States Supreme
148. 546 S.W.2d at 710.
149. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1976); Bankston v. Taft, 612 S.W.2d
216, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
150. 612 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
151. Id. at 218. See also Sprott v. Sprott, 576 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, writ dism'd).
152. 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978); see Brown v. Arlen Management Corp., 663 F.2d
575, 583 (5th Cir. 1981).
153. 572 S.W.2d at 666 n.2. The court defined loss of consortium as primarily consisting
"of the emotional or intangible elements of the marital relationship." Id. at 666. But see
generally Skarsten v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 40, 44 (D. Minn. 1981).
154. See White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981).
155. Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d737, 738 (Tex. 1981); Whittlesey v. Miller,
572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978).
156. 572 S.W.2d at 668.
157. Id. at 669; Skarsten v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 40, 44 (D. Minn. 1981).
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Court recently held that loss of consortium is a recoverable claim in mari-
time cases.' 58 But this right of recovery, like that in Whittlesey, has been
held not to apply retroactively. 59
In Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co. a federal district court held that the
right of recovery for loss of consortium defined in Whittlesey is applicable
to claims under the Texas Wrongful Death Act. 160 The court noted that
no distinction should be made between a spouse who suffers loss because
of the other's incapacity and one whose loss is the consequence of the
other's wrongful death. 161 Relying on language in Whittlesey v. Miller 162
and Bedgood v. Madalin ' 63 that the law should respond to modern social
and economic realities, the court predicted that when faced with the ques-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court would allow a recovery for loss of consor-
tium in a wrongful death action.1'4
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY
Interspousal Transfers. In Dyer v. Dyer165 the wife conveyed her interest in
the community home to her husband as his separate property. In a subse-
quent suit for divorce, brought more than four years after the conveyance,
the wife sought to set aside the deed claiming it was obtained by duress.
The court noted that a deed regular on its face procured by duress is
merely voidable and not void.' 66 Hence the wife's suit to set the deed
aside was barred by the four year statute of limitations 67 regardless of the
validity of the deed. 168
A significant development during the survey period regarding inter-
spousal transfers was the addition of section 5.04 of the Family Code. 169
This section is a codification of the new language in article XVI, section 15
of the Texas Constitution creating a presumption that a gift of property
from one spouse to the other includes the future income that may arise
from that gift.' 70 These additions to the Constitution and the Family Code
were designed to give effect to the probable intent of the donor and thus to
158. 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
159. Engle v. Ellis Corp., 509 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D. Tex. 1980). In Minyard Food
Stores v. Newman, 612 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam), the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the proposition that Whittlesey does not apply retroactively to causes of action
arising before its effective date. Id. at 199; see 572 S.W.2d at 669.
160. 506 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (E.D. Tex. 1981); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4672-
4677 (Vernon 1952), arts. 2678, 4671, 4675a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
161. 506 F. Supp. at 1258.
162. 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978).
163. 600 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring).
164. 506 F. Supp. at 1257, 1258.
165. 616 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
166. Id. at 665.
167. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
168. 616 S.W.2d at 665.
169. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
170. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. Although no such presumption exists regarding gifts to
a spouse from a third person, the donor may so define the gift to include income or the gift
in trust may merely consist of income. McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1896, writ ref d.); see Counts, Trust Income-Separate or Community Prop-
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facilitate more effective estate planning.' 7 ' Previously the Internal Reve-
nue Service argued that a gift from one spouse to the other was only par-
tially effective for estate and gift tax purposes because under community
property law that income from the donated property would be community
property in which the donor spouse would have a half interest.' 72 Al-
though the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had rejected the Service's argu-
ment on this point in Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 73 one of the
objectives of the changes in the Texas Constitution and Family Code was
to put this issue to rest. Concurrently, Congress also did its part by provid-
ing an effectively unlimited marital deduction for gift and estate tax com-
putations involving interspousal transfers.'
74
Intestate Succession and Community Administration. When one spouse
17
dies intestate, the other spouse may qualify as the community administra-
tor' 76 and as such exercise a broad, but not unlimited, range of manage-
ment authority over the former community estate. 177 A qualified
community administrator has the power to manage the former community
estate as if all of the property is his separate property (including the right
to use the community estate to discharge all community debts)' 78 provided
he does not appropriate the benefits to his own benefit. 179 The community
administration may be terminated one year after the survivor files the
bond as community administrator, 80 but In re Jackson '8' illustrates that
the community administration can continue considerably longer than a
year, if no action is taken to terminate it. At the time of the first spouse's
death in 1949, the community estate in Jackson consisted mainly of a small
farm. The surviving spouse qualified as the community administrator but
no evidence demonstrated that he ever made any accounting or distribu-
erty?, 30 TEx. B.J. 851 (1967). See also Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir.
1945); Commissioner v. Terry, 69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
171. For a more thorough discussion of the purpose of these changes, see McKnight,
1980 Survey, supra note 59, at 129-31.
172. The Tax Court had adopted this position in several cases. See Estate of Wyly v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977); Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682
(1977); Estate of McKee v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 35,049 (1978).
173. 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing the Tax Court's decisions in Estate of Wyly
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977) and Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682
(1977)).
174. I.R.C. § 2056.
175. Spouses of informal marriages have exactly the same rights in intestate succession as
do the spouses of formal marriages. In re Glasco, 619 S.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1981, no writ). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
176. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 161(c) (Vernon 1980).
177. Id. § 167.
178. Id. This includes the right to sell former community real estate, In re Jackson, 613
S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam sub nom. Harrison v.
Parker, 620 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1981), or the former community homestead, Brunson v.
Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 237, 239, 56 S.W.2d 1073, 1074 (1933).
179. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 167 (Vernon 1980); Gray v. Gray, 424 S.W.2d 309, 311
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
180. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 175 (Vernon 1980).
181. 613 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ re/dn.r.e. per curiam sub nom. Har-
rison v. Parker, 620 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1981).
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tion to the takers of the estate. The farm was sold in two parcels in 1963
and 1964, but no distribution of the proceeds was made. The community
administrator died in 1978. At no time before his death did the commu-
nity administrator or any takers of the estate request a termination of the
administration. After the administrator's death, one of the takers filed a
claim against the former administrator's estate for a share of the proceeds
of the sale of the land. The district court concluded that this claim was
barred by the two year statute of limitation. 182 The court of appeals, how-
ever, held that the Probate Code 183 permits the administrator to continue
to manage the community estate as trustee for the owners of the estate
until the administration is terminated.' 8 4 Thus the statute of limitation for
claims against the estate did not begin to run unless the trustee acted in
repudiation of the trust and the beneficiaries knew or should have known
of that act.' 85 The court stated that the community administrator had
never taken any action inconsistent with the community administrator's
duties and that no evidence of any notice to the claimant that those duties
were repudiated was presented.' 86 The claim, therefore, was not barred by
the statute of limitation. 187 In refusing a writ of error, the Texas Supreme
Court pointed out that the authority of Wingo v. Rudder, 88 under which
the sale would have constituted a repudiation of the taker's claim, could no
longer stand alongside the current provisions of section 167.189 Although
the court did not address the validity of the deed conveyed by the commu-
nity administrator, the result in Jackson is difficult to square with that
reached in Gray v. Gray in which such a deed of former community realty
granted by the qualified community administrator was held to be void. 190
Neither the court of civil appeals nor the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the conflicting opinion in Gray. The conflict, therefore, is unresolved, al-
though the supreme court's opinion can be construed to overrule Gray sub
silentio.
Transfersfor Limited Purposes. In Uriarte v. Petro191 an ailing wife trans-
ferred community property to her sister with instructions to use the assets
to take care of the wife. Following his wife's death, the husband brought
suit to recover the property remaining in the sister's hands. The jury found
that no gift was made from the deceased spouse to her sister. The trial
court therefore concluded that the sister held the assets as trustee under a
resulting trust with the husband as the beneficiary. In affirming this con-
182. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
183. TEx. PROB. CODE AN. § 167 (Vernon 1980).
184. 613 S.W.2d at 83.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 84.
187. Id.
188. 103 Tex. 150, 124 S.W. 899 (1910).
189. 620 S.W.2d at 102; see Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 167 (Vernon 1980); Harrison v.
Parker 620 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1981).
190. 424 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.).
191. 606 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1982]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
clusion, the court of civil appeals stated that because the limited purpose of
the transfer had been fulfilled, the remainder of the property reverted to
the deceased wife's estate and consequently to the surviving husband. 92
The transfer of assets to be used for the care of the ailing wife in Uriarte
presents facts similar to those in Dulak v. Dulak193 in which the father
established a joint account with his son for the limited purpose of enabling
the son to take care of the father. Once the limited purpose came to an end
the funds came under the exclusive control of the deceased father's estate
and were distributed according to his will. 194 The transfer of funds for a
limited purpose in Uriarte and Dulak are distinguishable from cases in-
volving constructively fraudulent gifts' 95 and illusory transfers196 because
the transfer for limited purposes is a valid transaction with an anticipated
reversion of the property to the transferor.
Spousal Liability. Brazosport Bank of Texas v. Robertson 197 presents a dif-
ficult case of credit liability under section 5.61 of the Family Code. 198 The
wife, who was employed at a substantial salary, desired to purchase an
expensive automobile. At the time of the transaction the couple was sepa-
rated. The husband informed the bank with which the wife was negotiat-
ing for a loan that he strenuously objected to the transaction and flatly
refused to have any part in it. Despite knowledge of the husband's attitude
toward the transaction, the bank extended credit to the wife to purchase
the car. Title to the car, on which the bank was given a lien, was in the
wife's name at her business address. Several years after the purchase, the
couple was divorced, and the ex-wife defaulted on the loan. After selling
the car, the bank brought suit against both former spouses to recover the
deficiency owing on the note. Although a judgment was recovered against
the ex-wife, the bank failed to obtain a judgment against the husband.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision and held that the
course of the negotiations showed that the bank impliedly agreed to look
solely to the wife's separate property for repayment, and therefore no lia-
bility fell on the husband. 199 In spite of the court's holding in Robertson
that the seller looked to the buyer's separate property for payment, the
facts suggest that the seller actually looked to the wife's earnings. Since
prior to the transaction the husband expressly denied any involvement in
the purchase, and the bank seemingly accepted his position, the bank
could not later change its position as to the husband's liability.
192. Id. at 25.
193. 496 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), a'd in part, rev'd in part, 513
S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1974).
194. 496 S.W.2d at 783, 785-86.
195. See Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421, 425-27 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. See Land v. Marshall, 426 S.W.2d 841, 849 (Tex. 1968).
197. 616 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
198. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
199. 616 S.W.2d at 366.
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The law is well settled that if property is bought on credit by either
spouse during marriage, it is community property unless the creditor
agrees to look only to the purchasing spouse's separate property for pay-
ment.200 As a corollary to this rule it was therefore said that the liability
constituted a "community debt,"20 an observation that accurately indi-
cated a source of satisfaction as long as the community was subject to the
husband's management. 20 2 Once the purchase has been characterized as
community property today, the question of liability for debt is more com-
plex, and describing the debt as falling on "the community" is not very
helpful. Under section 5.61 of the Family Code, community property sub-
ject to a spouse's sole or joint management is subject to liability for that
spouse's debt.20 3 The community property subject to the other spouse's
sole management is not liable,2°4 nor is that spouse's separate property. 20
Section 5.61 does not provide for the situation in which a creditor has
agreed to look solely to the contracting spouse for repayment with either
separate or community property. The court concluded in Robertson that
the husband was not intended to be involved in this situation and he had
no contractual liability apart from his interest in community property sub-
ject to the wife's sole or joint management. 20 6 Thus, once again, labeling
the liability as a "community debt" is found to be misleading.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act Benefits. Section 206(d)(i) of
ERISA mandates that all ERISA approved plans "shall provide that bene-
fits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. '20 7 Section
514(a) of the act further provides that ERISA preempts all state laws to the
extent that they relate to any ERISA approved employee benefit plan.208
These provisions raise serious questions as to the availability of ERISA
benefits for the satisfaction of debts.
In Operating Engineers' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky20 9
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an ex-spouse could
garnish the other ex-spouse's benefits in an ERISA approved trust to sat-
200. See Broussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 373, 295 S.W.2d 405, 406 (1956); Gleich v.
Bongio, J28 Tex. 606, 607-08, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1937). See also Ray v. United States, 385
F. Supp. 372, 377 (S.D. Tex. 1974), at'd, 538 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1976).
201. See, e.g., Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 171 (Tex. 1975); Anderson v.
Royce, 624 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
202. See McKnight, 1981 Survey, supra note 59, at 114-16; McKnight, 1980 Survey,
supra note 59, at 128-29; McKnight, Family Law.: Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 138-39 (1978) [hereinafter cited as McKnight, 1978 Survey];
McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 81-
82 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McKnight, 1974 Survey].
203. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975); see TPEA No. 5 Credit Union v.
Soils, 605 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
204. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(b) (Vernon 1975). /
205. Id. § 5.61(a). The contracting spouse's separate property is liable, however, by vir-
tue of general contractual principles. See generally Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d
162, 171 (Tex. 1975).
206. 616 S.W.2d at 367.
207. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
208. Id. § 1144(a).
209. 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981).
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isfy past-due support obligations. When the spouses were divorced, the
benefits of the trust were awarded to the husband as his separate property,
and the husband was ordered to make monthly payments for his ex-wife's
maintenance. After the husband retired and began receiving benefits from
the trust, he fell behind in his payments, and his ex-wife obtained a decree
ordering the trust to pay her the amount of accrued payments due and the
decreed amount of monthly payments in the future. The Federal District
Court for the District of Arizona denied the husband's request for a per-
manent injunction preventing the enforcement of the decree.210 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit Court held that even if ERISA did preempt
garnishments generally,2 1' an implied exception to ERISA allowed the
garnishment of ERISA-approved benefits by an ex-spouse in order to sat-
isfy court ordered spousal maintenance obligations.212
The court's assertion of an exception to the general preemption language
of section 5.14(a)213 for this type of case was based on presumed congres-
sional intent. 214 The court noted that both Congress and the courts tradi-
tionally give strong deference to state law in family matters, thereby
raising a presumption that federal statutes are not intended to interfere
with state domestic relations law.21 5 Moreover, the court stated that ER-
ISA did not expressly require that this type of garnishment be preempted
and "that these garnishments do not do 'major damage' to 'clear and sub-
stantial' federal interests. ' 216 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the ar-
gument that the anti-alienation language of section 206(d)(1) 217 prevents
the ex-spouse from garnishing ERISA-plan benefits to satisfy spousal
maintenance payments.218 The court noted that the statute only requires
the plan to contain the anti-alienation language, and that this garnishment
did not make compliance with that provision impossible. 219 Furthermore,
the court stated that Congress did not intend to create a means of avoiding
court ordered spousal support obligations, but rather the main purpose of
the statute was to ensure that the benefits were available upon retirement
of the participant. 220 Although Texas law does not recognize permanent
court ordered alimony,221 the Fifth Circuit might adopt this approach to
allow the garnishment of ERISA plan benefits to satisfy temporary support
210. Operating Eng'rs' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zambrosky, 470 F. Supp. 1174
(D. Ariz. 1979), aff'd, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981).
211. Operating Eng'rs' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zambrosky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th
Cir. 1981). Although the court based its opinion on the assumption that ERISA prohibits
garnishments generally, it did not so hold, and further it noted that there is a split of author-
ity on the issue. Id. at 198 n.2.
212. Id. at 199. The court stated there is an assumption that the police powers of the
states will not be superseded by federal statutes unless expressly stated.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
214. 650 F.2d at 199.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 199-200.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
218. 650 F.2d at 201.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967).
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orders and child support obligations. 222
In In re Turpin 223 a trustee in bankruptcy sought to include as part of the
debtor's estate his benefits in two ERISA approved retirement trusts that
had accrued prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Applying
section 70(a)(5) of the old Bankruptcy Act, 224 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that such future retirement benefits were not property that
passed to the trustee. 225 The court stated that a purpose of bankruptcy
proceedings was to allow a debtor a fresh start for the future and noted
that the Bankruptcy Act provides a fresh start by allowing the bankrupt to
be free of any prebankruptcy obligations, thus enabling him to accumulate
future wealth.226 The court also stated that the new Bankruptcy Code
classifies the debtor's rights to receive pension benefits as exempt property
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any of
his dependents. 227 Section 541(c)(2) of the new code also excludes from
the bankrupt's estate property subject to "[a] restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applica-
ble non-bankruptcy law."' 228 If sections 541(a)229 and 206(d)(1)230 of ER-
ISA prevent ordinary creditors from reaching a debtor's benefits in an
ERISA plan, such benefits should also be protected from a trustee in bank-
ruptcy by those sections. The same result, therefore, should be reached
under the new code as was reached under the old act.
Estate Tax Liability. Interesting questions of asset valuation for estate tax
purposes are raised when the community estate owns a majority of the
shares in a closely held corporation and one of the spouses dies. This
problem was addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of
Bright v. United States.231 In Bright fifty-five percent of the stock of a
closely held corporation had been owned as community property. Under
the terms of the deceased spouse's will her interest in the stock passed to
the surviving spouse as trustee for the benefit of their children. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service made two arguments concerning the valuation of the
stock for estate tax purposes: (1) the value of the stock should be one-half
of the value of the fifty-five percent plus a control premium; and (2) there
should be an application of family attribution rules between the shares
that the surviving spouse owned in his own right and those that he held as
trustee for the benefit of his children. Recognizing that under Texas law
222. But see Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510,
516 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (ERISA exemption held to preempt a commercial creditor's claim).
223. 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (Supp. III
1979). The case was controlled by the old law because the petition was filed before the new
code was enacted. 644 F.2d at 474.
225. 644 F.2d at 474.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 474 n.1; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (Supp. III 1979).
228. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
230. Id. § 1056(d)(1).
231. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981),
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each spouse can exercise testamentary powers of disposition over the
owned one-half interest in community property only and that fungible
shares of stock are readily partitionable, the Fifth Circuit summarily re-
jected the Service's first argument and concluded that the estate's interest
should be considered as only a 27.5 percent interest without any provision
for a control premium. 232
Several reasons were given for the court's rejection of the government's
second argument for application of family attribution rules. First, the
court determined that the weight of precedential authority was contrary to
such a result. 233 Further, family attribution in that context would be in-
consistent with the willing buyer-seller rule234 provided in the regula-
tions.235 The Bright court noted that in applying this rule the buyer and
seller should be viewed as individuals having reasonable knowledge of the
facts, and that the interest to be taxed should be valued at the moment of
death disregarding the interest that was held before death and the interest
held by the legatee as trustee after the testatrix-spouse's death.236 Noting
that the value for estate tax purposes should not be determined by refer-
ence to the identity of the trustee to whom it is devised, the court con-
cluded that the facts that the stock was previously held as part of the
community estate and that it was bequeathed to the surviving spouse as
trustee were irrelevant. 237 Furthermore, the court stated that the stock
would be considered as if held by an unrelated hypothetical seller.238
Homestead- Nature of the Interest. The long history of homestead protec-
tion239 under the Texas Constitution 240 dates back to laws passed under
the Republic. 24' Two recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions state
that the weight of Texas authority is that a homestead is akin to an estate
in land rather than merely an exemption from creditors' claims. 242 United
States v. Rogers243 illustrates a significant aspect of this distinction. The
Internal Revenue Service sought to foreclose a federal tax lien on the
homestead property of a surviving spouse. The couple acquired the prop-
232. Id. at 1001.
233. Id. at 1002.
234. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368.
235. 658 F.2d at 1005-06.
236. Id. at 1006-07.
237. Id. at 1007.
238. Id. The court also stated that an objective of its decision was to give stability and
predictability to this area of the law. Id. at 1006.
239. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 872-76 (Tex. 1978) (Chadick, J., dissent-
ing) (discussion of the history of Texas homestead protection).
240. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
241. See 0. SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAs § 453, at 543 (3d ed. 1929).
242. See United States v. Rodgers, 649 F.2d 1117, 1127 (5th Cir. 1981); Ingram v. Dallas
Dep't of Housing & Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F.2d 1128, 1131 (5th Cir. 1981). The
Supreme Court has consolidated these cases and granted certiorari. 102 S. Ct. 1748, 72 L.
Ed. 2d 160 (1982). The early development of Texas homestead law, however, shows some
confusion as to the property nature of the homestead. See 0. SPEER, supra note 241, § 457,
at 546-48.
243. 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981).
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erty in 1955 and at that time established it as their homestead. In 1971 and
1972, the Service assessed the taxpayer-spouse for past due federal wager-
ing taxes. The taxpayer-spouse subsequently died without paying the
taxes. The surviving spouse, who had not been assessed a tax liability,
continued to reside on the homestead property. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals pointed out that this was not a case in which both spouses had a
tax liability2 "4 or one in which the community property levied upon was
not homestead property.245 Because the property was the homestead of
the spouse who owed no federal tax liability, the court held that the Serv-
ice could not foreclose on the homestead to satisfy the tax liability of the
deceased spouse under Texas law.246 The court noted, however, that had
the homestead right been merely an exemption, the federal lien could have
been foreclosed. 247 The court concluded that in Texas the homestead was
a present possessory estate in land despite noting two early Texas Supreme
Court and two similar civil appeals cases to the contrary. 248 The Fifth
Circuit reached a similar result in Ingram v. Dallas Department of Housing
& Urban Rehabilitation.249 The court reaffirmed the proposition that the
Texas homestead protection is subject to a federal tax lien if the tax liabil-
ity is a joint liability of the spouses as opposed to a sole liability of one
spouse.250 Although the taxpayer spouse was deceased in Rogers and the
spouses were divorced in Ingram, the result should be the same if the mar-
riage is still continuing.
Homestead- Designation and Extent. Because the homestead is defined in
terms of acreage (rural) or value (urban) exclusive of the value of any im-
provements thereon, 25' courts are not ordinarily concerned with the value
244. Id. at 1122. The law is well established that the state homestead laws would not
prevent foreclosure on the homestead if both spouses had an outstanding federal tax liabil-
ity. Ingram v. Dallas Dep't of Housing & Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F.2d 1128, 1131 (5th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Estes, 450 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1971); Shambaugh v. Scofield,
132 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1942). For a discussion of federal tax lien priority, see Carroll,
Priorities and Subordination in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 17 Hous. L. REV. 223,
236-41 (1980).
245. In Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972), the court allowed the
federal government to foreclose on the non-taxpayer spouse's sole management nonhomes-
tead community property to satisfy the obligation of the other spouse's prenuptial tax liabil-
ity. Id. at 1100-01.
246. 649 F.2d at 1125.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1126 n.16. The cases the court noted were Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83
S.W.2d 620 (1935); Foster v. Johnson, 89 Tex. 640, 36 S.W. 67 (1896); White v. Glenn, 138
S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Lee v. McFarland, 46
S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref'd).
250. 649 F.2d at 1127.
251. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp.
1982). One commentator has recently suggested that there should be an increase in the land
value exemption from $10,000 to $30,000. See McElroy, Proposals For Revisions to Texas
Civil Statutes, 44 TEX. B.J. 257, 265 (1981). See generally TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1982) ($10,000 lot for urban homestead). A
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to raise the lot value to $25,000 or any
larger amount set was filed February 25, 1981, H.J.R. No. 69, but did not meet with legisla-
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of improvements that are located on a homestead.252 Once the homestead
is established, the property may be sold, and the homestead protection
covers the proceeds for six months so that they may be reinvested in an-
other homestead.253 In Braden v. New Ulm State Bank254 a judgment cred-
itor, after a request by the debtor, refused to release a judgment lien
abstracted against the property and later filed suit to garnish the proceeds
of the sale of the homestead that were being held in escrow by the title
company pending release of the judgment lien. The debtor asserted that
she had been prevented from reinvesting the funds in a new homestead
because the escrow agent would not release the funds until the lien was
removed. The funds were still in the agent's hands after six months had
elapsed after the sale. This case raises the question of whether the credi-
tor's failure to release the lien, despite the debtor's request for a release,
amounted to an impermissible taking prohibited by article 3834. How-
ever, the issue was not before the court because of the debtor's failure to
introduce summary judgment evidence on the point.255 A judgment credi-
tor is permitted to abstract a judgment that will reach all non-exempt real
property of the debtor in a county while the debtor is still in possession of
his homestead there. 256 Such filing is allowed because of the possibility
that there may be a subsequent abandonment of the homestead as well as
the possibility that not all of the property claimed as homestead is exempt.
The same analysis can apply to the creditor's refusal to release a lien dur-
ing the statutory grace period; otherwise, the creditor may lose the oppor-
tunity to satisfy the judgment when the six month period expires.
In James Talcott, Inc. v. Valley Federal Savings & Loan Association257 a
different sort of deposit was in issue. A judgment creditor sought to gar-
nish tax and insurance funds held in escrow by a savings and loan associa-
tion for the benefit of the judgment debtor. The court of appeals held that
the funds in dispute, although relating to the ownership of the debtor's
homestead, are not part of the homestead right.258 The homestead argu-
tive approval. A more practicable solution to the problem of matching realistic lot values
for urban homesteads with inflationary demands would be to amend the Constitution to
define the urban homestead in terms of square feet or a fraction of an acre. Once the urban
homestead is defined on an area basis like the rural homestead, there would no longer by
any need for continuous constitutional and statutory amendments to match the pressures
generated by an inflationary economy.
252. See 0. SPEER, supra note 241, § 466, at 562. For a discussion of whether mobile
homes are chattels or part of the realty for homestead exemption purposes, see Dean, What
Is a Mobile Home? The Law and Manufactured Housing, CASE & COMMENT, Sept.-Oct.
1981, at 10.
253. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3834 (Vernon 1966) provides that the proceeds are
exempt from garnishment for six months following the voluntary sale of a homestead.
254. 618 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
255. Id. at 782.
256. See generally Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 593-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas),
writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973). The lien does not, however, attach
to the property at any time while it remains homestead property. 494 S.W.2d at 593-94. A
purchaser of the property while maintained as a homestead, therefore, takes it clear of the
judgment, as if the lien did not exist. Id. at 594.
257. 611 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
258. Id. at 694.
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ment alone, therefore, did not prevent their seizure. 259
The initial burden of establishing that property is homestead property is
on the claimant of the protection. 260 Once the claimant has established his
homestead, the burden shifts to the creditor to disprove its continued exist-
ence.26' The burden amounts to a presumption that the homestead contin-
ues to exist until its termination is proved. 262 The court in Pace v.
McEwen263 stated that the homestead claimant has the burden of proof on
the issue of homestead status;264 however, this does not mean that the
claimant has the burden of proof for all homestead issues. In Pace the
claimant failed to meet the initial burden of establishing a homestead be-
cause there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the funds used
to acquire the property had been fraudulently obtained by the claimant. 265
Investment in a home cannot be used as a shelter for ill gotten gains. 266
The essential requirements for an effective abandonment are an intent to
abandon permanently coupled with overt acts of abandonment. 267 The
claimant's temporary renting of the homestead does not constitute an
abandonment of it.26a In In re Root269 the debtor had purchased a tract of
land and built a duplex thereon. After the construction was completed, the
debtor's family moved into one-half and made it their residence. The
other half was rented. The debtor subsequently filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. The trustee sought to prevent the rental portion of the property
from being set aside to the debtor as exempt. The court held that because
the debtor's predominant purpose in building the duplex was to provide a
residential homestead, the rental of a portion of the residence did not re-
duce the homestead protection accorded to the entire lot.270 The outcome,
however, would be different if the debtor had built a detached rent house
259. Id. The court concluded that the deposit of escrow funds did not constitute a fund
that was recoverable by the judgment debtor and therefore could not be garnished by the
judgment creditor. Id.
260. See Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1972); Gill v. Quinn, 613
S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ). In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S.
Ct. 1195, 67 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981), the United States Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's
former gender based community property management statute as unconstitutional. Id. at
1199, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 433-34. Because the Texas community property management and
homestead statutes are gender neutral, this case does not represent a serious threat to Texas
law.
261. Chalk v. Daggett, 257 S.W.228, 232 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt adopted).
262. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. 1971); Welborne v. Downing, 73
Tex. 527, 530-31, 11 S.W. 501, 502 (1889); Gill v. Quinn, 613 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
263. 617 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
264. Id. at 818.
265. Id.
266. See Baucum v. Texam Oil Corp., 423 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
267. Hudgins v. Thompson, 109 Tex. 433, 438, 211 S.W. 586, 587 (1919); Gill v. Quinn,
613 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
268. TEx. Co NsT. art. XVI, § 51; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3833(b) (Vernon Supp.
1982).
269. No. 281-00035 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., June 29, 1981).
270. Id., slip op. at 2; see Thomas v. Tyler, 6 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928,
judgmt adopted) (adopting the decision of the court of appeals, 297 S.W. 609, 610-11 (Tex.
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on their urban property instead of a duplex.271
Prior to 1973, the Texas Constitution provided homestead protection for
a family but none for a single adult except one who acted as head of a
family or was a surviving family constituent. 272 A man and woman living
together in a meretricious relationship did not constitute a family for
homestead purposes. 273 In 1973, however, the Constitution was amended
to permit single adults independent of any familial association to claim
homestead protection. 274 Under this provision there is no reason why un-
married persons who are living together should not be allowed to claim a
homestead as single adults. In Tremaine v. Showalter,275 however, the
court held that a homestead was not maintainable by an unmarried couple
living together, when the claimant was not single but married to someone
else.276 The plaintiff, while his divorce from his first wife was still pending,
purchased the disputed property and moved onto it with the woman who
would subsequently become his second wife. Before the divorce from his
first wife was granted, the plaintiff sold the property to his solely owned
corporation so that he could mortgage the property to raise funds for the
business. When the company defaulted on the note, the creditor sought to
foreclose under the deed of trust. The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin this
sale, claiming that the property was his homestead and that the sale to the
corporation was void as a pretended sale277 for the purpose of mortgaging
homestead property. Although the case could have been disposed of by
considering whether the sale to the corporation was merely a sham, the
court of civil appeals chose first to consider the homestead character of the
property. The court held that during the time prior to the sale to the cor-
poration the plaintiff was still married to his first wife and hence the dis-
puted property could not qualify as his homestead as either a single adult
or head of a family. 278 The debtor's undivorced wife had continued to
occupy the family home which was in all probability community property.
Although the point was not clearly made, the court probably concluded
Civ. App.-Galveston 1978), reaching the same result with a single building containing four
separate apartments).
271. See Atwood v. Guaranty Constr. Co., 63 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933,
judgmt adopted). But see Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (construction of trailer park on portion of rural homestead
not an abandonment of that portion as homestead).
272. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52; Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1978);
Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 595, 19 S.W.2d 35, 38 (1929).
273. Lane v. Phillips, 69 Tex. 240, 241, 6 S.W. 610 (1887); Barker v. Lee, 337 S.W.2d 637,
639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ); Senegar v. LaVaughan, 230 S.W.2d 311, 312
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1950, no writ).
274. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50.
275. 613 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
276. Id. at 37.
277. The constitution provides that all pretended sales for the purpose of mortgaging a
homestead are void. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; see Toler v. Fertitta, 67 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1934, judgmt adopted). In Tremaine the court did not have to address the
issue of whether the sale was void as a pretended sale; rather the court held that the property
was not the homestead of a single adult or of a family. 613 S.W.2d at 37.
278. 613 S.W.2d at 37.
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that the debtor was attempting to claim two homesteads at once. The an-
swer to that argument, however, is that the husband had abandoned his
wife and his homestead claim to the family home.279 The first wife, there-
fore, could claim the first property as her homestead and the husband
could claim the new house as his.
As a general rule a lien does not result from a money judgment until the
judgment has been properly abstracted. 280 If property already owned be-
comes a debtor's homestead after the judgment is rendered, but before it is
abstracted or execution is levied, the property is entitled to homestead pro-
tection. 28' If, however, a judgment lien attaches before the property
achieves its homestead quality, the judgment creditor can foreclose his
lien.28 2 As long as the law only recognized a family homestead, a divorce
normally terminated a homestead of a childless couple.28 3 But with the
creation of the single-adult homestead, the homestead character of prop-
erty is not necessarily destroyed by a divorce of a childless couple. If one
of the parties continues to maintain the property as a homestead, it auto-
matically becomes a single adult's homestead.284 Moreover, the divorce
does not create a gap in time during which a third-party creditor's lien may
attach.28 5 If, however, the lien is for a purpose for which a valid lien may
be fixed on a homestead, the lien is valid. Thus, when the court creates an
equitable lien on one spouse's separate homestead property in order to
secure the other spouse's rights of reimbursement against the property aris-
ing on divorce, 286 or to secure payment of the amount awarded to the
other spouse for that spouse's homestead interest, 287 the lien is valid. Al-
though the court in Day v. Day emphasized that the equitable lien was
created before the debtor spouse actually asserted the property as his
279. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.85(a) (Vernon 1975) refers to this type of situation (com-
munity homestead) while id. § 5.83(a) deals with a related situation (separate homestead of
the abandoned spouse).
280. Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
281. See id.
282. Id. at 199; In re Dawkins, 11 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
283. See, e.g., Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1972); Tanton v.
State Nat'l Bank, 125 Tex. 16, 19, 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1935). In Henry S. Miller Co. v.
Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), however, the
homestead protection did not cease on the divorce of the childless couple because the wife's
mother lived with her thus providing a new family relationship to support the continued
homestead quality of the property. Id. at 244-45.
284. Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ); see Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ
ref'd n.re.). Prior to-the creation of single-adult homesteads, similar results could be
reached only if the spouse was a remaining family constituent. Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley,
475 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1972); Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 595, 19
S.W.2d 35, 38 (1929).
285. Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1981, no writ).
286. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no
writ); Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
287. Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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homestead,288 the court in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer properly indicated that
such a lien is valid regardless of when the debtor spouse claimed the
homestead.289 Although an equitable lien can be placed on a divorced
spouse's separate property to secure the payment of marital reimbursement
properly falling on that property, a court may not subject the exempt prop-
erty to an equitable lien for the purpose of securing past-due child support
payments or any other purpose for which exempt property cannot be
burdened. 290
The mere intention to establish a homestead on property is not sufficient
to impress the property with homestead character.29' An intention to re-
side thereon followed by overt acts of preparation evidencing that intent,
however, has been held sufficient to impress the property with homestead
character.292 In In re Weathery 293 the spouses owned two houses, one in
which they had previously lived and a new one to which they had recently
moved. In divorce proceedings the court entered an interlocutory order
requiring the husband to make repairs to the first home for the wife's occu-
pancy because a valid lien on the new home was about to be forclosed.
The couple's new house was sold and the wife, after being abandoned by
the husband, moved into an apartment waiting for the repairs to be com-
pleted on the old home. The husband, however, quit paying for the repairs
and the wife had no money available with which to complete them. No
judgment of divorce had been entered. Subsequently one of the husband's
creditors abstracted a judgment against the property and sought foreclo-
sure against it. The wife filed a petition in bankruptcy and sought relief
from the bankruptcy court, claiming the property as the family homestead.
Finding that the wife had standing to assert the homestead claim, 294 the
court held, despite the fact that there was no actual occupancy of the prop-
erty as a homestead, that there were sufficient overt acts of preparation
evidencing an intent to establish a homestead on the property to impress it
with a homestead character.295 The court based its decision on the fact
that the wife had claimed the old house as her homestead since the first
house was sold, that the couple had never entirely abandoned the property
when they originally moved from it, that repairs were commenced pursu-
ant to the divorce court's temporary order, and that the wife sought to
enforce that order against the husband when he ceased paying for the
repairs.296
Homestead- Exemption in Bankruptcy. Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy
288. 610 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
289. 623 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
290. Id. at 466.
291. Gilmore v. Dennison, 131 Tex. 398, 400, 115 S.W.2d 902, 902 (1938).
292. Spence v. Spence, 455 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970,
writ refd n.r.e.).
293. No. 281-00077 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., Oct. 1, 1981).
294. Id., slip op. at 5.
295. Id. at 4.
296. Id. at 6.
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Code allows a debtor to choose either the federal bankruptcy exemptions
provided under section 522(d) of the Code297 or the state and other federal
exemptions to protect his property in a bankruptcy proceeding, unless state
law otherwise prohibits such a choice.298 Section 522(m) provides that
each debtor in a joint bankruptcy case may choose exemptions individu-
ally.299 In In re Cannady3°° a husband and wife filed a joint petition in
bankruptcy. The husband chose to assert state exemptions: the commu-
nity residence under article 3833(a)(3) and items of community personal
property under article 3836(a). 30 1 The wife, however, chose to assert the
alternative federal exemptions under section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code including several items of community personal property, some of
which were the same as those that the husband had claimed as exempt.
The bankruptcy court recognized the right of joint debtors to choose the
state and federal exemptions but precluded the husband from claiming the
family personal property exemption amounting to a total of $30,000 in-
stead of a total of $15,000 allowed a single adult.302 The court reasoned
that if the family exemption was asserted, the wife was already afforded
the protection of state law and a claim of the federal exemption would give
the spouses an untoward advantage as against their creditors. 30 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, held that the husband
could select the family exemption under state law because Texas law30 4
permits only one spouse to assert the family personal property exemp-
tion.305 Moreover, the court noted that Congress knew that the Bankruptcy
Code, as enacted, would permit such windfalls to occur but chose to leave
it up to the states to pass legislation restricting that result.3°6 The court
was not required to address the issue of whether the husband could assert
the full family homestead protection because the homestead was urban,
and its extent is determined under Texas law by the same standard regard-
less of the marital status of the claimant. 30 7 Based on the Court of Ap-
peals' interpretation of the Code's legislative history, however, the result
should be the same for a husband asserting a full family rural homestead,
the extent of which is determined by family status, while the wife claims
other federal exemptions. Because of this potential windfall, a couple
filing as joint bankrupts will so assert their exemption claims until the
297. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. Ill 1979).
298. Id. § 522(b).
299. Id. § 522(m). For a comparison of federal and Texas exemptions see Comment, The
New Bankruptcy Code.- A Comparison of Texas and Federal Exemptions, 17 Hous. L. REv.
373 (1980).
300. 653 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1981).
301. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3833(a)(3), 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
302. 653 F.2d at 213.
303. Id. at 212, 213.
304. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3859 (Vernon 1966). Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656
F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1981), illustrates a state law restricting the selection of the federal
exemption.
305. 653 F.2d at 214; see In re Maitland, 13 Bankr. 923, 926 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
306. 653 F.2d at 214.
307. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
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Congress responds to suggestions for better protection of creditors. 30 8
In re Reed3°9 involved a debtor who, prior to filing a petition in bank-
ruptcy, liquidated several items of nonexempt personal property, some at
prices significantly below their market values. Thereafter, the proceeds
were used to reduce outstanding liens against his exempt homestead realty.
The debtor and his wife subsequently filed a joint petition in bankruptcy
and claimed homestead protection for their residence under Texas law.
The trustee objected to the blatant prebankruptcy planning and challenged
the debtor's entitlement to the homestead protection. The court upheld the
debtor's claim to the homestead because the Texas Constitution only pro-
vides for the forced sale of the homestead to satisfy purchase money liens,
improvement liens, and taxes.310 The constitutional provision precludes
the Texas Legislature from including language in article 3833311 similar to
that in article 3836(b), 312 preventing the conversion of non-exempt person-
alty into exempt personalty in order to defraud, delay, or hinder credi-
tors.31 3 The court noted that the result would have been different had the
debtor converted the property into otherwise exempt personalty.314 Al-
though the debtor was able to protect the assets from forced sale by con-
verting them into exempt realty, the court, in a separate opinion, held that
his actions were sufficiently fraudulent to prevent his discharge in bank-
ruptcy.315 This conclusion is severely suspect.316
Taxation of Homesteads. On November 3, 1981, Texas voters approved a
constitutional amendment allowing political subdivisions to exempt a per-
centage of the market value of the homestead residence of a married or
single adult from ad valorem taxes. 3 17 Thus, as amended, Article VIII,
section 1-6(e) of the Texas Constitution permits the creation of an exemp-
tion from ad valorem taxes of not more than forty percent of market value
for the years 1982 through 1984, thirty percent for the years 1985 through
1987 and twenty percent thereafter.318 Unless the legislature otherwise
prescribes, the amount of the exemption may not be less than $5,000. 3 19
The amendment does not prevent the application of otherwise available
exemptions.
Article VIII, Section 21(c) was amended to require the legislature to en-
308. See Record Statement of Claude Rice, Esq., Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Esq., and Professor
Jonathan M. Landers, On Problems of Consumer Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
Before the Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, April 3, 1981, 35
QUARTERLY REPORT 158, 166-67 (1981).
309. 12 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
310. 12 Bankr. at 43-44; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
311. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
312. Id. art. 3836(b).
313. See 12 Bankr. at 43.
314. Id.
315. In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 683, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
316. But see note 266 supra.
317. H.J.R. No. 81.
318. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(e).
319. Id.
[Vol. 36
FAMIL Y LAW. HUSBAND AND WIFE
act legislation providing that a property owner be given (1) notice of a
revaluation of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation and (2) a rea-
sonable estimate of the amount of taxes that would be imposed if the total
amount of property taxes for the subdivision were not increased.3 20 While
revamping the Propeity Tax Code, the 1981 legislature made several other
changes affecting homestead property.3 21
IV. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Filing Fees. In Brown v. Clapp3 22 the wife filed for divorce with a pauper's
oath that she was destitute and unable to pay the filing fee. The plaintiff's
only source of income at the time she signed the affidavit was a welfare
check and food stamps. Finding that the trial judge abused his discretion
in denying waiver of filing fees, the appellate court held that being depen-
dent on public charity is prima facie evidence that a person is financially
unable to pay court costs.3 23 The court also noted that the right to proceed
in forma pauperis depends on the affiant's inability to pay the costs at the
time of making the oath rather than a possible future ability to do so.324
Jurisdiction and Venue. A waiver of service of process must be executed
after suit is brought.325 The requirement is jurisdictional, and hence a
waiver executed prior to filing of the action is void. This statutory require-
ment is so well established in Texas law that it is sometimes thought to be
constitutional. It is, therefore, surprising to find a case such as Tidwell v.
Tidwell, in which the rule appears to have been violated, requiring appel-
late review.326
In Waldron v. Waldron 327 the wife filed suit for divorce in Potter County
alleging that to be the residence of both parties. Service of process was
attempted on the husband in Florida but the sheriffs return of the citation
did not comply with Rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.3 28
320. Id. § 21(a),(c).
321. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.13(j) (defining the residence homestead), 11.27 (ex-
empting solar or wind powered energy devices), 11.431 (Vernon Pam. 1981) (dealing with
late applications for homestead tax exemptions).
322. 613 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
323. Id. at 80.
324. Id.
325. TEx. R. Civ. P. 119 provides:
The defendant may accept service of process, or waive the issuance or serv-
ice thereof by a written memorandum signed by him, or by his duly author-
ized agent or attorney, after suit is brought, sworn to before a proper officer
other than an attorney in the -case, and fied among the papers of the cause,
and such waiver or acceptance shall have the same force and effect as if the
citation had been issued and served as provided by law.
See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2224 (Vernon 1981).
326. 604 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
327. 614 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
328. Trax. R. Civ. P. 108 provides:
Where the defendant is absent from the State, or is a nonresident of the State,
the form of notice to such defendant of the institution of the suit shall be the
same as that prescribed for citation to a resident defendant; and such notice
may be served by any disinterested person competent to make oath of the fact
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The husband did not appear in the case and the plaintiff introduced no
evidence at trial to prove his Texas residence. The court granted the di-
vorce and awarded the plaintiff certain property. The wife subsequently
instituted a proceeding to enforce the property rights granted her under the
decree. The husband argued that the court never acquired in personam
jurisdiction over him because his wife failed to prove his Texas residence
and the service of process on him in Florida was defective. The husband
went on to argue that because the court had subject matter jurisdiction of
the cause for divorce, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed
except for the portion concerning the division of property. 329 The
Amarillo court of civil appeals concluded that the trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction to try all the issues in the case. 330 Nevertheless, until
the court's jurisdictional power was properly invoked, the court was not
authorized to exercise such power.33' Although the trial court had poten-
tial jurisdiction to render judgment, it was never activated because of the
defective service. 332 The court, therefore, refused to remand part of the
case and affirm the rest because to do so would ignore the jurisdictional
defect. 333 The trial court's actions were unauthorized, because neither in
rem nor in personam jurisdiction had been set in motion.334
In a Dallas case335 involving similar issues, the wife, who did not appear
at the hearing, contended that the service of process on her was defective
in the same manner as provided in Rule 106 hereof. The return of service in
such cases shall be endorsed on or attached to the original notice, and shall be
in the form provided in Rule 107, and be signed and sworn to by the party
making such service before some officer authorized by the laws of this State to
take affidavits, under the hand and official seal of such officer. A defendant
served with such notice shall be required to appear and answer in the same
manner and time and under the same penalties as if he had been personally
served with a citation within this State to the full extent that he may be re-
quired to appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States in an
action either in rem or in personam.
329. The husband argued that the trial court could not award his ex-wife money from the
community in his possession because that award was a money judgment to be paid from
personal property in his possession outside of Texas. 614 S.W.2d at 649. The court rejected
his argument because the record did not reflect the location of the property awarded to his
wife. If he had been subject to personal jurisdiction of the court, he might have been or-
dered to transfer the property regardless of its location. Id. at 650.
330. 614 S.W.2d at 650; see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1906
(Vernon 1964).
331. See Texas v. Olsen, 163 Tex. 449, 360 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1962).
332. 614 S.W.2d at 650.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 651. Compare Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ) with Risch v. Risch, 395 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ dism'd), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1967). The appellate court in Fox affirmed the trial court's divorce
decree in part and reversed it in part. The trial court did not have inpersonam jurisdiction
over the respondent because she lacked the requisite minimum contacts with Texas and
therefore the court could not appoint her managing conservator or divide property located
outside the state. The appellate court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the
marital relationship because its dissolution is an in rem proceeding and in this case, it fell
under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (Vernon 1975). The appellate court in Risch, however,
reversed the trial court's judgment as to matters inpersonam but affirmed as to matters in
rem.
335. Owen v. Owen, 620 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
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because a judgment was rendered on the plaintiffs amended petition but
the officer's return recited that she was served with the original petition.
The citation itself recited that the amended petition was delivered to the
sheriff for service. The court concluded that it was not certain whether the
wife was served with the original petition only or with the amended peti-
tion. Because the court was unable to correct the defect, 336 the court re-
manded the case for trial noting that the wife had subjected herself to the
court's jurisdiction by pursuing her appeal.337
In Berry v. Berry the court upheld the constitutionality of Texas's re-
quirement of six months' domicile in the state and ninety days' residence
in the county before filing a suit for divorce. 338 The court held that while
rights conferred by a venue statute may be waived by the parties, 339 waiver
cannot be invoked to nullify this mandatory statutory restriction, espe-
cially when the restriction is enacted for the benefit of the general public as
opposed to those benefits that inure to an individual.340 The court re-
marked that the Texas durational domicile requirement implements a pol-
icy of not cultivating the business of those seeking quick divorces 341 and
that the three months' county residence requirement provides an addi-
tional safeguard against a collateral attack.342 Furthermore, this residence
requirement must be met before a court may grant a temporary injunction
ancillary to the divorce. 343
Grounds. After the wife filed her petition for divorce in Ferguson v. Fergu-
son, 344 the parties resumed cohabitation and were still living together
when the wife was granted a decree of divorce. The husband neither filed
an answer nor appeared at trial but argued on appeal that additional serv-
ice of process upon him was required because of the parties' resumption of
their marital situation. The trial court had heard evidence on the at-
tempted reconciliation as well as the grounds alleged for divorce and ap-
parently was satisfied that no reconciliation had been achieved. The
336. Id. at 670.
337. Id.
338. 612 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ dism'd). TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975) states:
No suit for divorce may be maintained unless at the time suit is filed the peti-
tioner or the respondent has been a domiciliary of this state for the preceding
six-month period and a resident of the county in which the suit is filed for the
preceding ninety-day period.
339. See South Tex. Dev. Co. v. Williams, 130 Tex. 217, 107 S.W.2d 378, 379 (1937); 1 R.
McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 4.40, at 556 (rev. 1965).
340. 612 S.W.2d at 215-16. See also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. American Statesman, 552
S.W.2d 99, 105-06 (Tex. 1977) ("Waiver cannot be invoked to nullify a mandatory statutory
restriction especially when such restriction is enacted for the benefit of the general public as
opposed to those benefits that inure to a privateindividual."); Sartin v. Hudson, 143 S.W.2d
817, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940, no writ) ("A right or privilege given by a statute
may be waived or surrendered in whole or in part by the party to whom or for whose benefit
it is given.").
341. 612 S.W.2d at 215.
342. Id.; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 408 (1975).
343. Mlcoch v. Mlcoch 612 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
344. 610 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
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husband had not pled condonation because he evidently saw no purpose of
pleading at all. The appellate court rejected the husband's argument and
concluded that the parties' "purported reconciliation" did not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction.3 45 Although the appellate court referred to the
wife's decree as a default judgment, the wife clearly offered sufficient evi-
dence of grounds for divorce. Hence, the appellate court's opinion seems
to amount to no more than a dictum concerning whether the 1973 repeal of
the requirement of section 3.64 that the petitioner offer "full and satisfac-
tory evidence" of grounds for divorce allows a court to grant a default
judgment for divorce. Nevertheless, the opinion provoked a strong dissent
from Chief Justice Dies who stated that the wife had not met her burden of
presenting facts entitling her to divorce because she testified that her hus-
band had continued to live with her in ordinary marital circumstances af-
ter the filing of the divorce suit.346 In the Chief Justice's view, if the
spouses are living together under circumstances that one spouse thinks of
as a marital relationship in apparent reliance on the conduct of the other
spouse, the marriage cannot be insupportable as against him.347
Pleadings. The spouse seeking community reimbursement for improve-
ment of property by enhancement of its value has the burden of plead-
ing348 and proving the amount of the community contribution and the
enhanced value.349 Although the wife's pleadings in Wachendorfer v.
Wachendorfer suggested the existenceof separate property of the husband
that received a benefit, the trial court was found to have committed error
in submitting a special issue on reimbursement when the pleadings con-
tained no allegations as to reimbursement. 350 The pleading that "there are
many equities in [the wife's] favor" and the allegation that she should be
awarded a substantial portion of all property did not put the husband on
notice of the wife's reimbursement claim.351
Fault need not be pled in order to be considered by the trial court in the
division of marital property. Because the pleadings in Bray v. Bray did not
allege fault, the defendant asserted that it should not be considered by the
trial court in the property division.3 52 The Corpus Christi court of civil
appeals stated that although "[tihe better practice would be, of course, to
plead 'fault', which would allow all such evidence to be admitted," 353 the
trial court had broad discretion in the division of property354 and could in
345. Id. at 560. See Strange v. Strange, 464 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1971).
346. 610 S.W.2d at 561.
347. Id.
348. Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ
dism'd).
349. Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952); Weatherall v. Weather-
all, 403 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ).
350. 615 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
351. Id.
352. 618 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism'd).
353. Id.
354. See Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981) (trial judge has broad discretion in
dividing property and may look at many factors in its determination, including fault);
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the exercise of that discretion consider fault.355
Continuance. The decision whether to grant a motion for continuance lies
within the sound discretion of the trial judge.356 A litigant, however, may
not complain that trial commenced without adequate preparation time if
he has made no motion for continuance. 35' The court in Rylee v. McMor-
rough emphasized that this rule applies to summary judgment hearings
although an application for more time under rule 166A 358 does not require
compliance with all the requirements of rule 252. 359 Although Barber v.
Barber360 does not appear to be a case involving a motion for continuance,
an interval of over four months elapsed between the time the court heard
evidence on the grounds for divorce and the hearing on division of prop-
erty. The reason for the recess or continuance is not explained, but the
appellant raised no objection at the time. The court found that without a
timely objection "to trying the case in a piece-meal manner," the appellant
had waived any grounds she might have had for complaining of an abuse
of discretion by the trial court.36 1
Trial by Jury. A litigant must take affirmative action to avoid waiver of his
right to a jury trial. On the other hand, the mere paying of a jury fee will
not secure the right in the absence of a demand for a jury.3 62 Calling upon
the court to decide an issue of fact and then participating in the hearing
without complaint will constitute a waiver of the right to a jury.363 When
the right to trial by jury is properly secured in a divorce suit, however, the
verdict with respect to division of the estate is advisory only.36
Evidence Supporting Property Division. In passing upon a no evidence
point, with respect to a division of property made by the trial court, an
appellate court must consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment
and disregard all evidence or inferences to the contrary.365 When a judg-
Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1980) (fault may be considered but is not required to
be considered in the property division).
355. 618 S.W.2d at 95.
356. Barber v. Barber, 621 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
357. Snell v. McCracken, 70 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
358. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166A (summary judgment).
359. 616 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd). Tex.
R. Civ. P. 252 requires the party seeking continuance on the ground of want of testimony to
make an affidavit that the testimony is material, that he has used due diligence and that it
cannot be obtained from another source. If the grounds are the absence of a witness, he
must name the witness and what he expects to prove by him and must state that the continu-
ance is not merely a delaying tactic.
360. 621 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
361. Id. at 673-74.
362. Walker v. Walker, 619 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); see
TEx. R. Crv. P. 216.
363. 619 S.W.2d at 198.
364. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 616 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ).
365. 617 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); see Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 565 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978).
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ment awards an item of property in accordance with an alleged agreement
and no stipulation or evidence appears in the record to support that result,
the judgment cannot be sustained.366 An exception was made for judg-
ments providing for equal division of an income tax refund when an equal
division "would probably be effected as a matter of law."'367 No error has
been found when a trial court awards a percentage equity share in the
parties' homestead rather than a specific dollar amount, especially when
the percentage approach was requested by the appellant in the special
issues.368
Finality ofJudgment. A trial court has plenary power within thirty days to
modify, correct, or reform its judgment before it becomes final and may
enter a different judgment in the final written form from that originally
announced. 369 An attack on a final judgment on the ground that the prior
judgment is erroneous constitutes a collateral attack and can succeed only
if the judgment is void.370 A judgment that erroneously divests a party of
separate property is not void;371 the remedy for such a judgment based on
an error of substantive law is appeal, not collateral attack.372
A divorce decree rendered in June, 1975, awarded the wife, as part of
the property partition, installment payments at the rate of $1,000 a month
for a period of one hundred months beginning in April, 1975. In a subse-
quent suit373 to recover for her husband's nonpayment of the installments,
the court awarded the ex-wife all matured and unpaid installments and the
discounted value of all remaining unmatured installments. In his appeal,
the ex-husband contended that the attempt to accelerate future payments
amounted to relitigation of the divorce decree in that his ex-wife sought, in
effect, to alter its terms by accelerating the unmatured installments and
obtaining judgment ahead of the payment schedule. 374 The appellate
court agreed. 375 Put another way, it may be said that the principle of an-
ticipatory breach is applicable to a contract but not to a judicial decree. It
366. ' 617 S.W.2d at 288. The judgment of the trial court recited that for consideration the
wife had released her rights to a policy of insurance on her husband's life. The appellate
court reformed the trial court's judgment to delete the reference to the insurance policy. Id.
367. Id.
368. Killpack v. Killpack, 616 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ
refd n.r.e.).
369. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329(d) provides that a judgment does not become final until 30 days
after the date of judgment. See, e.g., Bray v. Bray, 618 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1981, writ dism'd ) (judge allowed to issue written judgment different from his oral
judgment within period).
370. Templeton v. Ferguson, 89 Tex. 47, 33 S.W. 329 (1895). Cf. Waldron v. Waldron,
614 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (lack of jurisdiction renders judg-
ment void and subject to collateral attack).
371. Williams v. Williams, 620 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
372. Id. at 749; King v. King, 291 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, writ
dism'd).
373. Walker v. Walker, 619 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
374. Id. at 198.
375. Id. Cf. Day v. Day, 603 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. 1980) (final divorce decree cannot be
collaterally attacked in a subsequent suit to partition nondisposed property).
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was said elsewhere, however, that once the parties have agreed on a prop-
erty settlement that contains a provision for periodic payments, a suit to
recover missed payments does not involve matters incident to divorce but
is instead more akin to an independent action on a contract.376 But if such
a settlement is incorporated in the decree, the contract is merged in the
judgment 377 and may thereby be made impervious to the argument of
acceleration.
McCarty v. McCary378 raises the question of validity of prior final judg-
ments dividing military retirement benefits on divorce. When the United
States Supreme Court concluded in McCarty that military retirement pay
was not subject to division as community -property, retired servicemen
throughout the land ceased making payments under prior decrees. The
existing condition of Texas law further encouraged this result, because on
two occasions the Texas Supreme Court had already granted writs of
habeas corpus to retired servicemen who had defied court orders dividing
Veterans Administration benefits. 379 In the more recent of those cases, Ex
parle Burson, the trial court was said to have committed fundamental er-
ror, and the court's judgment was therefore void. 380 The principle of res
judicata does not appear to have been argued. When that issue was
presented to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in an analogous
case, Erspan v. Badgett, the court concluded that the former judgment had
to stand.38' In 1963 a Texas divorce court ordered the husband to pay his
ex-wife one-half of his military retirement pay. He complied with the or-
der until 1967. The ex-wife obtained a judgment for the unpaid benefits in
1971, and the ex-husband responded by filing a petition in bankruptcy. He
listed his ex-wife's divorce judgment and the later judgment debt of his ex-
wife among his debts. Although the ex-wife received notice of the pro-
ceeding, she did not object to a discharge that was granted. After several
years, the ex-wife sued for later arrears under the divorce decree and the
ex-husband sought to restrain her suit by an injunction from the bank-
ruptcy court that had granted his discharge. In an appeal from a federal
district court sitting in Texas, the Fifth Circuit refused to reverse the award
of a money judgment against the ex-husband for the unpaid benefits and
the restraint imposed upon him from seeking relief in the bankruptcy
court.382 McCarty was fully discussed, and the principle of res judicata
was deemed applicable to the divorce court's award.
376. Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, writ refd n.r.e.). Cf. DeLeon v. Page, 611 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Chris-
ti 1980, no writ) (partition action in essence a suit to enforce prior divorce judgment).
377. Lxparte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979).
378. 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).
379. Exparte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1981); Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453
(Tex. 1979).
380. 615 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1981).
381. 659 F.2d 26, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane per curiam).
382. 647 F.2d 550, 553-56 (5th Cir. 1981). Cf. Ealy v. Ealy, 616 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1981, writ dism'd) (suit to force sale of husband's homestead barred be-
cause divorce decree gave homestead to husband as separate property, and thus it was res
judicata).
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Murray v. Murray383 was another case dealing with military retirement
benefits. The court held that an order of dismissal, because a settlement
was reached, became a judgment on the merits and precluded a former
wife's subsequent suit to partition her former husband's military retire-
ment benefits.384
Motion for a New Trial. A new trial may not be granted on the ground of
new evidence unless it is shown that the evidence was obtained after trial
on the merits, and that with due diligence it could not have been discov-
ered sooner.385 In Mushinski v. Mushinski386 a husband contended that a
divorce court had improperly divided property that he could trace as his
separate property and, therefore, a new trial should be granted. The ap-
pellate court refused to grant the husband a new trial. None of the evi-
dence that was adduced at a hearing for a new trial in support of his
contention of traceable separate funds 387 was newly discovered, because
the evidence was known and available to him at the hearing on the
merits.388
In Givens v. Givens 389 the denial of the appellant's motion for a new trial
was sustained because there was no showing that the appellant's evidence
could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence prior
to trial.390 In response to the appellant's contention that the evidence ad-
duced had a substantial bearing on the equitable division of property, the
court stated that the appellant did not show in what way or to what extent
this evidence should affect a property division about which no specific
complaint was made.391 The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discre-
tion by overruling the motion for new trial.392
A different standard exists for granting a motion to set aside a default
judgment. The rule in Texas is that
A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any
case in which the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment
was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part,
but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided the motion for a
new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the
granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to
383. 611 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
384. Id. at 174. But see Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981).
385. Givens v. Givens, 616 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ).
386. 621 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
387. For discussion of the "tracing" concept in Texas, see notes 97-117 supra and accom-
panying text.
388. 621 S.W.2d at 670-7 1. See also Moore v. Moore, 616 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
389. 616 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
390. The appellant's post-trial discovery indicated that medical expense incurred as a
result of a beating by the appellee would not be covered by insurance, and that additional
hospitalization was required. Id. at 451.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 452.
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the plaintiff.393
The appellant has the burden of establishing his explanation for not
filing an answer.394 In Roberts v. Roberts 395 the appellant's alleged excuse
was that he relied upon his wife's telling him that her divorce suit had been
dismissed and that he need not hire an attorney and the couple had contin-
ued to cohabit. This account would have supported a finding in the appel-
lant's favor, but it was refuted by the appellant's wife and her daughter.
The court held that the movant had not met his burden of proof.396 In
Mootz v. Mootz 397 a motion for new trial was denied because the movant
failed to set up a meritorious defense consisting of facts which in law
would constitute a defense to the cause -of action asserted by the
plaintiff.398
Appeal. Generally a litigant cannot treat a judgment as both valid and
invalid. If a litigant has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment, he
cannot afterward prosecute an appeal therefrom.399 An exception to the
general rule, however is recognized in situations when the litigant accepted
and retained the benefits because of financial duress. 4°° In Gonzalez v. Gon-
zalez401 the appellant-wife filed an affidavit disclosing that she accepted
the benefits of the judgment because she was destitute. The court held that
the wife's affidavit showed that the husband had not discharged his burden
of showing that her acceptance of benefits was voluntary. 4°2 The court
accordingly allowed the wife's appeal to be considered on the merits.403 In
two other cases, however, appeal was foreclosed by the voluntary accept-
ance of benefits of the decree contested. In Deskus v. Deskus4°4 voluntary
acceptance of benefits was evidenced by both parties' prompt recordation
of the deeds given to them in the property division. In In re Rutherford40 5
the appellant-husband sold several items of community property awarded
393. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126
(1939); see Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966); Roberts v. Roberts, 621 S.W.2d
835, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ); Mootz v. Mootz, 615 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
394. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1973).
395. 621 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
396. Id. at 836.
397. 615 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
398. Id. at 249. See also Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d,212, 214 (Tex. 1966).
399. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950); DeCluitt v.
DeCluitt, 613 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd).
400. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472-73, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950); DeCluitt v.
DeCluitt, 613 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd). Cf. Vallone v.
Vallone, 618 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ granted) (appeal
allowed when acceptance of some of benefits was out of practical necessity rather than
voluntary).
401. 614 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ dism'd).
402. Id. at 204. The court found that the affidavit disclosed an involuntary acceptance of
benefits because of the financial duress. Id.
403. Id. at 205.
404. 614 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
405. 614 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ dism'd).
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to him in the judgment and used the proceeds of the sales for his benefit in
non-necessitous circumstances.
A party is entitled to sue out of writ of error as an alternative method of
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeals if (1) the petition
for writ of error is filed within six months after the final judgment is ren-
dered,4°6 (2) the petitioner did not participate in the actual trial of the
case,407 and (3) the invalidity of the judgment appears on the face of the
record.408 In Garcia v. Garcia40 9 the husband, who was in prison at the
time, failed to appear at trial in person or through his attorney, who had
inadvertently noted the wrong trial date. After the husband's motion for
new trial was overruled, a petition was filed for a writ of error. The appel-
late court held that although the husband had met the first two require-
ments for appeal by writ of error, he failed to establish a showing of the
invalidity of the judgment from the face of the record. 410
Bill of Review. Although a bill of review is an equitable proceeding
designed to prevent manifest injustice, it nonetheless proceeds by very
strict standards. Before a litigant can successfully set aside a final judg-
ment by bill of review, he must allege and prove within the time allowed a
meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment,
which he was prevented from making by fraud, accident, or wrongful act
of the opposite party, unmixed with any fault or negligence on his own
part.411 In DeCluitt v. DeCluitt412 the ex-wife sought a bill of review to set
aside the property-division portion of a divorce judgment413 and sought a
new trial on the grounds of extrinsic fraud, duress, and mental incompe-
tence in the execution of a waiver of citation and property settlement
agreement. She waited more than twenty months after the divorce to file
the bill but asserted that she acted as soon as she recovered her mental
health and learned she had been deceived about the extent of the commu-
nity estate. Evidence was presented concerning her mental and physical
illness and psychiatric care. In granting the bill and remanding the case
for a new trial, the court held that factual issues existed relating to the
question of whether the wife had a meritorious defense to the trial court's
division of the community property and whether her claim was barred by
406. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2255 (Vernon 1971).
407. Id. art. 2249a.
408. McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 132, 345 S.W.2d 706, 709 (1961).
409. 618 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
410. Id. at 118-19. The court noted that it would have been a simple matter for the
husband to have filed an inventory of all the community and separate assets owned by him
either before trial or with the motion for a new trial so that his claim of a disproportionate
award of property could be evaluated by the court. Because no such evidence was in the
record, the court held the trial court's judgment was not invalid on the face of the record.
Id. at 119.
411. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568-69, 226 S.W.2d 996, 999 (1949).
412. 613 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
413. The claim was made in the alternative to setting aside the entire divorce decree. Id.
at 778.
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laches.414 In addition, the court held that the husband's remarriage, crea-
tion of a new community estate, and disposal of some of the assets received
in the decree did not entitle him to summary judgment because there was
no showing that whatever prejudice he might experience could not be rem-
edied upon retrial of the case.415 On the other hand, in Rylee v. McMor-
rough416 the wife's bill of review failed for two reasons. First, she was
unable to prove that her husband committed extrinsic fraud and, secondly,
she admitted signing a property settlement agreement and waiver of cita-
tion and was thereby prevented from asserting a lack of negligence on her
part.417
InAnderson v. Anderson41 8 the former wife filed a bill of review over two
years after a divorce decree was signed. More than four years later, the
case was dismissed for want of prosecution because the wife had not re-
quested a trial setting. The wife asserted that she was unconditionally de-
prived of her remedy. She defended her delay by alleging temporary
incapacity to prosecute the case caused by her phobia of the judicial pro-
cess. The appellate court rejected this argument and concluded that she
failed to use due care in the prosecution of her cause of action.419
V. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Exercise fDiscretion. The trial court has broad discretion in determining
the disposition of property in suits for divorce and this discretion will not
be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown.420 The property need
not be divided equally;42' the trial court is required only to divide the es-
tate of the parties in a fair, just and equitable manner. 422 The discretion of
the trial court is not unlimited, however; some reasonable basis is neces-
sary for the court to decree an unequal division of the community
estate. 423
414. Id. at 781.
415. Id. See Hornblower, Weeks, Noyes & Trask, Inc. v. Reedy, 587 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
416. 616 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd).
417. Id. at 652.
418. 617 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
419. Id. at 778.
420. Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758,
762 (Tex. 1980); McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976); Cockerham v.
Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 173 (Tex. 1975); Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974).
See Barber v. Barber, 621 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ); Mendoza v.
Mendoza, 621 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ); Villarreal v. Villar-
real, 618 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ); Mogford v. Mogford,
616 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ); Arrington v. Arrington, 613
S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ); Walker v. Walker, 608 S.W.2d 326
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
421. Colley v. Colley, 597 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ). Cf. Huls v.
Huls, 616 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (reasonable basis
for unequal division).
422. TEX. FAm. CODE ANr. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982); McKibben v. McKibben, 567
S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
423. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,
no writ).
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Because of the wide discretion afforded trial courts in such matters, only
a very few cases yearly are overturned as an abuse of discretion in the
division of property. Zamora v. Zamora424 was such a case. A no-fault
divorce was granted and the wife was appointed managing conservator of
the children. Although the husband was a skilled worker and the wife was
not, their earning capacity did not differ greatly and neither had any sepa-
rate property. The community estate consisted of the family home worth
$35,000 with a mortgage of $7,800, an automobile worth $3,500 subject to
a loan of $1,900, a second car worth $800 with no corresponding debt, and
approximately $3,000 in community retail indebtedness. The trial court
awarded the wife sole title to the house and the encumbered automobile
with assumption of the indebtedness on it, and ordered her to pay approxi-
mately one-third of the community retail indebtedness. The net value of
her share was $27,700. The husband, on the other hand, was awarded the
$800 car and was ordered to pay the rest of the community debt, for a total
share of the community estate worth a negative net value. The appellate
court held the gross disparity between the dollar value of the property re-
ceived by the parties under the trial court's division was not justified by the
facts or conclusions of law and that, therefore, such an unequal division by
the trial court constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 425
In Roberts v. Roberts426 the trial court made a division of property based
upon a finding that the wife had successfully traced her separate property
into assets on hand at dissolution of the marriage. The Waco court of civil
appeals reversed the property division as an abuse of discretion because
the wife did not meet the rules of tracing427 as to any particular prop-
erty.428 An error by the trial court, however, in characterizing property as
separate or community is not necessarily reversible unless the division is
manifestly unfair and consequently an abuse of discretion.429 The Dallas
court of civil appeals in Smith v. Smith4 30 stated that it found no cases
mandating a reversal of an unequal division that would be within the trial
court's discretion under section 3.63431 even if the court mischaracterized
community property as separate, unless the party contesting the property
division showed that the trial court would have made a different division
of the property had such property been properly characterized. 432 The
court characterized the problem as one of appellate procedure433 and not
one involving the invasion of separate realty, as condemned in Eggemeyer
424. 611 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
425. Id. at 663.
426. 621 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
427. For a discussion of tracing, see text accompanying notes 97-117 supra.
428. 621 S.W.2d at 838.
429. See Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974); Crowell v. Crowell, 578 S.W.2d 562,
564-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Muns v. Muns, 567 S.W.2d 563, 567-68
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
430. 620 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
431. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
432. 620 S.W.2d at 625. But see In re York, 613 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ).
433. 620 S.W.2d at 625.
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v. Eggemeyer.434
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Texas held in Young v. Young that in a
divorce granted on a fault ground, the trial court could consider the fault
of one spouse in the break down of the marriage in making a "just and
right" 435 property division.436 The same issue arose in 1981 in Murif v.
Murff,437 and the court reiterated its conclusion. The court pointed out,
however, that "this does not mean that fault must be considered, only that
it may be considered. '438 Furthermore, the court held:
[T]he trial court, in exercising its direction in the making of prop-
erty divisions, may consider such factors as the spouses' capacities and
abilities, benefits which the party not at fault would have derived
from continuation of the marriage, business opportunities, education,
relative physical conditions, relative financial condition and obliga-
tions, disparity of ages, size of the separate estates, and the nature of
the property. . . . Likewise, the consideration of disparity in earning
capacities or of incomes is proper and need not be limited by "necessi-
tous" circumstances. 439
The wife in Barber v. Barber"44 contended that the trial court abused its
discretion in neglecting to consider the difference in earning power, age,
health, and fault in the break up of the marriage, as reflected in its "too
equal" division. The appellate court rejected her argument and held that
in light of substantial equality between the spouses' expected earnings and
retirement benefits, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.441 The
main asset belonging to the parties in Vallone v. Vallone442 was stock in
Tony's Restaurant, Inc. The stock had been transferred to the husband by
his father. The trial court adjudged that the stock was owned forty-seven
percent as the separate property of the husband and fifty-three percent as
community property. Accordingly, it awarded the stock to the husband
subject to a $300,000 promissory note to his wife. The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court had abused its discretion because of the follow-
ing factors: the labor and skills of both spouses caused the stock to
appreciate during the marriage from $20,000 to $1,000,000; the relative
earning capacities of the parties were disparate, $200,000 for the husband
as compared to his wife's $9,600; the husband had extensive knowledge of
434. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977). For a discussion of Eggemeyer see McKnight, 1978
Survey, supra note 202, at 122.
435. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
436. 609 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. 1980).
437. 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981).
438. Id. at 698 (quoting Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980)). Cf.
Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (fault of
a spouse as a proper consideration).
439. 615 S.W.2d at 699 (footnote omitted). See Bokhoven v. Bokhoven, 559 S.W.2d 142,
144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ); Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233-34 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ); Allen v. Allen, 363 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1962, no writ).
440. 621 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
441. d. at 675.
442. 618 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
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the restaurant business while his wife had limited business experience, and
the value of the husband's separate property was $470,000 compared to the
wife's $71,000." 3
In Bray v. Bray444 the husband complained that the trial court's unequal
division was based on evidence of fault improperly heard by the court be-
cause the wife had failed to allege fault in her pleadings. The appellate
court noted that the supreme court's holdings in Young v. Young 44 5 and
Murff v. Mturff, 446 did not clarify whether the trial court might consider
fault in the division of property in a no-fault divorce. Acknowledging that
the better practice would be to plead fault, which would allow all such
evidence to be admitted, the court of civil appeals stated that in this case,
however, the wife's failure to plead fault did not warrant overturning the
trial court's property settlement.447 But in addition to the trial court's
broad discretion and the factors enumerated in Murif favoring the wife,
the court noted the existence of secret bank accounts of the husband and
his failure to introduce any evidence of the value on the property he re-
ceived as his share of the community estate and stated that it was not con-
vinced that the unequal property division was manifestly unjust. 48
An appellate court, in Frausto v. Frausto ,49 for the first time dealt with
the issue of the divisibility of a medical education as part of a community
estate450 in the "somewhat typical" 45' situation which occurs when one
spouse continues to work while the other spouse is obtaining a degree that
results in higher potential earnings for the degreed spouse. Following the
lead of California, the court452 held that a professional education acquired
during marriage was not a property right divisible upon divorce and that
awarding future monthly payments that were specifically referable to an
education received by a spouse during marriage would violate the rule in
Eggemeyer.453 The court recognized the inequities that could result from
the failure to compensate the spouse who supported the other spouse
through college or professional school but it concluded that such difficul-
ties were overcome by a trial court's wide discretion to consider many fac-
443. Id. at 824.
444. 618 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism'd).
445. 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980).
446. 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981).
447. 618 S.W.2d at 95-96.
448. Id. at 96.
449. 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ dism'd).
450. The court also dealt with the issue of the wife's reimbursement for her share of the
community expense for her husband's education. Id. at 660. For a discussion of the reim-
bursement considerations, see notes 475-510 infra and accompanying text.
451. 611 S.W.2d at 658.
452. See Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786 (1969) (husband's educa-
tion for the practice of law not susceptible to monetary valuation for division on divorce).
This conclusion was reaffirmed in In re Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446
(1979). A Colorado court in In re Graham, 38 Colo. App. 130, 555 P.2d 527 (1976), also
found that education was not a property item capable of division. The Frausto court found
only one state that had held that a spouse had a property interest in the other spouse's
professional degree. 611 S.W.2d at 659. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1979).
453. 611 S.W.2d at 659; see Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
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tors in dividing the estate of the parties in a divorce decree, including the
difference in earning capacity and the education and ability of the par-
ties. 454 This rationale, however, is of no comfort to the non-degreed
spouse when, as in Frausto, no significant community estate has been
accumulated.
Property Acquired dhile Domiciled Elsewhere. As of September 1, 1981,
the concept of what in California parlance is referred to as quasi-commu-
nity property45 5 was annexed to Texas divorce law. Subsection (b) added
to Family Code section 3.63456 provides that on divorce or annulment the
property subject to division includes all that property acquired during the
marriage by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere if the property would
have been community property if the acquiring spouse had been domiciled
in Texas.457 The statute also covers that property traceable to an exchange
for such property.45 8 Although section 3.63(b) covers property which for-
merly would have been called separate property because so termed in the
state of acquisition, the definition does not conflict with that of article XVI,
section 15 of the Texas Constitution. Nor does it recharacterize property
as community property. It merely provides a standard for property divi-
sion on divorce.459 At the same time, however, the statute may be re-
garded as interfering with rights of sole ownership acquired in a sister
state. 460
Divestiture of Separate Property. After Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, holding
that a spouse could not be divested of title to separate realty, 46 1 the
454. 611 S.W.2d at 659; see Hedke v. Hedke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W.2d 21 (1923);
Bokhoven v. Bokhoven, 559 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ); Copeland v.
Copeland, 544 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ); Cooper v. Cooper, 513
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, no writ); Dobbs v. Dobbs, 449
S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ).
455. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West 1976).
456. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982) reads:
In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall also order a division of
the following real and personal property, wherever situated, in a manner that
the court deems just and right having due regard for the rights of each party
and any children of the marriage:
(1) property that was acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere
and that would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the
property had been domiciled in this state at the time of the acquisition; or
(2) property that was acquired by either spouse in exchange for real or
personal property, and that would have been community property if the
spouse who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this
state at the time of its acquisition.
457. Id. § 3.63(b)(1).
458. Id. § 3.63(b)(2).
459. Article XVI, § 15 provides that "[a]ll property, both real and personal, of a spouse
owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent,
shall be the separate property of that spouse." TEx. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 15.
460. See generally Oldham, Property Division in a Texas Divorce of a Migrant Spouse.,
Heads He Wins, Tails She Loses?, 19 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1981).
461. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977); see Villarreal v. Villarreal, 618 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981 no writ).
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supreme court decided Campbell v. Campbell,462 which enunciated the
same rule for separate personalty. Six months after a motion for rehearing
was filed, however, the opinion in Campbell was withdrawn when the par-
ties settled their dispute. The court promptly granted a writ of error on the
same point in Cameron v. Cameron,463 which followed the court's reason-
ing in the Campbell opinion.
In Frausto v. Frausto the appellate court not only held that a profes-
sional degree acquired during marriage is not a property right divisible
upon divorce464 but also held that an award of future monthly payments
referable to a professional education violated the rules of Eggemeyer and
Campbell.465 The court stated that such payments would be an award of
future earnings, which constitute separate property.466
In Mogford v. Mogford,467 a tract of land that was one half the separate
property of the husband and one half community property was sold by
order of the trial court to achieve partition. The husband contended that
the order of sale wrongfully divested him of his separate real estate in vio-
lation of Eggemeyer and the Texas Constitution.468 The appellate court
rejected his contention, holding that the sale did not interfere with his title
but merely changed the form of his separate realty to personalty.469
The decision in McCarty v. McCarty,470 that the United States system of
military retirement benefits precludes a state court from dividing military
retirement benefits as community property, has displaced the principle an-
nounced by the Texas Supreme Court in Busby v. Busby.471 Though
doubting the wisdom of McCarty, the courts of appeal have had no choice
but to follow the rule.4 72 In Trahan v. Trahan the Supreme Court of Texas
462. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 391 (June 7, 1980), withdrawn 613 S.W.2d 236 (Nov. 22, 1980).
463. 608 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ granted); see McKnight,
1981 Survey, supra'note 59, at 136-38. See also Mendoza v. Mendoza, 621 S.W.2d 420, 423
n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ), in which the court expressed the view that
the assumption that a divorce court may make an unequal division of the community estate
is not beyond challenge in light of Eggemeyer, Campbell, and TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19. The
court also pointed out that the unequal division of community assets could be considered
inconsistent with the philosophy underlying the adoption of the community property system.
Id.
464. For a discussion of this portion of the opinion, see notes 449-54 supra and accompa-
nying text.
465. 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ dism'd). In addition
the court relied on Benedict v. Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981,
writ dism'd), and Garrett v. Garrett, 534 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, no writ).
466. 611 S.W.2d at 659.
467. 616 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
468. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 15, 16 and art. I, § 19.
469. 616 S.W.2d at 945.
470. 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).
471. 457 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1970).
472. "Whether we agree with the majority opinion's reasoning or the scholarly dissent,
we are bound to follow the Supreme Court's holding in McCarty .. " Koon v. Koon, 621
S.W.2d 834, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ). "We have no choice, therefore,
except to hold that the trial court erred by awarding [wife] a portion of [husband's] military
retirement benefits." Jeffrey v. Kendrick, 621 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ). See also Exparte Acree, 623 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981);
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held that military retirement benefits left undivided in a pre-McCarty di-
vorce had not become a tenancy in common by operation of the principle
of res judicata.473 In so doing the court somewhat disingenuously distin-
guished a holding of the Fifth Circuit that would have allowed an unap-
pealed pre-McCarty division of military retirement benefits to stand.474
Reimbursement. The community estate is entitled to reimbursement for
funds expended to purchase a spouse's separate property or to reduce the
indebtedness thereon 475 and for improvements made on the separate prop-
erty.476 If the amount of reimbursement is measured by the lesser of cost
or enhancement in value, evidence must be presented that establishes the
enhanced value of the separate property and the amount expended.477 In
Villarreal v. Villarreal the court held that in the absence of such evidence
the trial court could not make a proper computation of reimbursement and
thus a "just and right" division of the estate. 478 The right of reimburse-
ment is applied along equitable principles479 and will not be awarded un-
less the expenditures of the contributing estate are greater than the benefits
received by it.48s
Snider v. Snider48 was a widow's action against the executors of her
deceased husband's estate for an accounting between his separate estate
and their community estate. The court held that reimbursement to the
community of the cost of improving the decedent's separate homestead
was proper when such costs produced an enhancement in value in that
amount, and that the widow's continued occupancy of the homestead did
not foreclose her claim for community reimbursement. 48 2 While the trial
Powell v. Powell, 620 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ). See generally
McKnight, Dealing with reimbursement and federal retirement benefits on divorce, TRIAL
LAW. F., Jan.-March 1982, at 13.
473. 626 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. 1981).
474. See Erspan v. Badgett, 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
475. See Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943) (commu-
nity estate should be reimbursed when community funds used to repay mortgage on spouse's
separate property acquired before marriage); Villarreal v. Villarreal, 618 S.W.2d 99, 101(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (community estate entitled to reimbursement
for funds expended to improve and purchase separate property).
476. See Pruske v. Pruske, 601 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ
dism'd) (community estate entitled to reimbursement for improvements to separate
property).
477. Villarreal v. Villarreal, 618 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981,
no writ).
478. Id; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) that provides: "In a
decree for divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in
a manner that the court deems just and right having due regard for the rights of each party
and children of the marriage."
479. 618 S.W.2d at 684; see Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 319, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628
(1935) (amount allowed for improvements limited to enhanced value of the property).
480. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 612 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no
writ). But see Brooks v. Brooks, 612 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ)
(reimbursement allowed without proof that expenditures exceeded benefits received by
community).
481. 613 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
482. Id. at 9; see Ogle v. Jones, 143 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, writ
ref d).
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court has discretion to impose a charge or lien on the improved separate
property rather than a cash award, the court found that the imposition of
such a charge would force-the widow to elect between present reimburse-
ment and continued occupancy of the homestead.483 The court also ob-
served that both the community and separate estates appeared to be
sufficiently substantial to discharge any reimbursement without a forced
sale.484 Additionally, the court allowed reimbursement to the community
for payments of annual installments on the husband's separate property
from a checking account that existed prior to the marriage after the execu-
tor had failed to establish the separate nature of the account. 48 5 The court,
however, denied community reimbursement for taxes and insurance paid
on the husband's income producing interest in a farm and for interest paid
on the outstanding debt because the community enjoyed the income from
the separate property for those expenses. 486
In Brooks v. Brooks487 the couple was supported solely through the
funds of the husband's wholly owned corporation, which was in existence
at the time of the marriage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
reimbursement to the husband on behalf of his separately-owned corpora-
tion in the amount of $48,000, that represented the capital depletion suf-
fered by the corporation for purchase and payment of community assets
owned by the parties at the time of divorce.488 The court reasoned that the
net worth 489 of the company was $63,000 at the time of the marriage and
$15,000 at the time of the divorce, thus the couple not only withdrew all of
the money the company earned during the marriage but also $48,000 from
the company's capital structure.490 In addition, the court upheld the reim-
bursement to the husband for the decrease of cash values of separate life
insurance policies, resulting from loans made against the policies during
the marriage.491 The court stressed that the reimbursement awards seemed
fair and equitable because the community estate acquired by the parties
greatly exceeded the total of reimbursements to the husband's separate
estate.492
In Wachendorfer v. Wachendorfer, the appellate court remanded a case
due to pleading defects in which the wife was awarded her share of reim-
483. 613 S.W.2d at 9.
484. Id. at 10.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. 612 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
488. Id. at 237.
489. Net worth is defined as the "remainder after deduction of disabilities from assets."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 939 (5th ed. 1979).
490. 612 S.W.2d at 238.
491. Id. at 237-38. The policies had a cash value of $17,200 with no loans against them
at the time of marriage. On the date of divorce, the cash values were $37,700 against which
were loans totalling $27,900, leaving a net cash value of $9,800. The amount of reimburse-
ment awarded was the net loss of $7,400. Id. at 238.
492. Id. at 237-38. As explained in McKnight, supra note 472, at 14, the situation was
treated as one of reimbursement, although "it really constituted a third party claim for
restitution."
[Vol. 36
FAMIL Y LAW. HUSBAND AND WIFE
bursement to the community estate for the enhancement of the husband's
separate corporation.493 In so doing, the court left open the question of
whether a reimbursement claim need be based on money contributed or if
time, labor, and efforts would suffice.4 94 The court noted that the holding
in Hale v. Hale,495 which did not allow reimbursement for such a non-
monetary claim, has been criticized.496 The court stated: "Although we
are not aware of any recovery in Texas by a spouse for the contribution of
community labor to the enhanced value of the other spouse's separate cor-
poration, we cannot say that there can be no such recovery under Texas
law."
4 9 7
In Frausto v. Fraus1o498 the wife sought reimbursement for her share of
community expenses contributed to her ex-husband's medical education.
The appellate court rejected her claim because the education of one of the
spouses was held not to be a property right and thus not divisible upon
divorce. 499 Because the wife's pleadings had not sought reimbursement,
the appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding her such portion of the community estate.500
Attorney's Fees. In a divorce suit the court may award either spouse attor-
ney's fees as part of the court's equitable powers to make a just and fair
division of the marital estate.50 The award is discretionary with the
court50 2 and must be supported by evidence503 and should bear some rea-
493. 615 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). No
pleading expressly asserted the right to community reimbursement. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 301
(judgment of the court must conform to the pleadings).
494. Id.
495. 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
496. 615 S.W.2d at 854. See Castleberry, Constitutional Limitations on the Division of
Property Upon Divorce, 10 ST. MARY'S L. 36, 64 (1978).
497. 615 S.W.2d at 855.
498. 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
499. Id. at 659.
500. Id. at 660.
501. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982); see Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469,
474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (Tex. 1950) (court can require husband to pay all of wife's
attorney's fees); Austin v. Austin, 619 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no
writ) (court may award either spouse his or her attorney's fees as part of court's equitable
powers); Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ
dism'd) (court did not abuse its discretion in requiring husband to pay wife's attorney's fees).
502. The trial court, in making an award of attorney fees should consider the nature of
the case, nature of the services rendered, the amount of property involved, the client's inter-
est at stake, the amount of time devoted by the attorney, and the skill and experience reason-
ably needed to perform the services. See Treadway v. Treadway, 613 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ dism'd) (citing McFadden v. Bresler Malls, Inc., 526
S.W.2d 258, 263-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ) (discussing factors court should
consider in making award of attorney's fees)). But see Saums v. Saums, 610 S.W.2d 242, 243
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd) (holding that although an attorney's fee may be
normal and customary, it may nonetheless be considered unreasonable in light of its rela-
tionship to the client's income).
503. See Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966) (when
party offers no proof of reasonableness of attorney's fees recovery of such fees will not be
allowed); Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ) (on appeal, evidence on attorney's fees must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party); Warner v. Warner, 615 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1982]
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sonable relationship to the amount in controversy. 5 4 Opinion evidence as
to what the correct amount of attorney's fees should be is not conclusive
and does not bind the trial court. 505
The attorney's fees are but one factor to be considered by the "court in
making a division of the estate, considering the conditions and needs of the
parties and all of the surrounding circumstances. 50 6 No specific statute
permits either spouse to collect attorney's fees from the other upon divorce,
nor are such fees recoverable as costs, 50 7 and the trial court is not bound to
award anything as attorneys' fees.508 If parties to a divorce are perma-
nently reconciled, the attorneys are entitled to recover the reasonable value
of services rendered, despite an agreement for a contingent fee. 509 The
trial court is not authorized to award attorney's fees in a contempt pro-
ceeding brought to enforce a provision in a divorce decree.
510
Enforcement. In 1975, prior to entry of a divorce decree by a Harris
County domestic relations court, the parties entered into a property settle-
1981, no writ) (award of attorney's fees must be supported by the evidence); Underhill v.
Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.)
(reasonableness of attorney's fees is required to be supported by competent evidence);
Reames v. Reames, 604 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (absent
statement of good cause, trial court could not assess one-half of wife's attorney's fees against
the husband in divorce action).
In Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) the party
responsible for payment of attorney's fees was directed to file a remittitur because there was
no evidence in the record to justify the trial court's award of $1500 in the event of a writ of
error to the Texas Supreme Court. Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 603 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (holding that when attorney's fees exceeded
amount to which attorney was entitled, such fees were impermissible and could be cured by
remittitur).
504. See Treadway v. Treadway, 613 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981,
writ dism'd). See also Paugh v. Paugh 579 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ)
(attorney's fee should bear reasonable relationship to amount in controversy).
505. Warner v. Warner, 615 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no
writ).
506. See Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469,
474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005. See also Mendoza v. Mendoza, 621 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (fact that husband has to pay attorney's fees is factor to
be considered in court's division of community property); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 616
S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (court did not abuse
discretion in ordering each party to pay his or her own attorney's fees); Brooks v. Brooks,
612 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (trial court did not abuse discre-
tion in refusing to award wife attorney's fees despite fact that her attorney spent 84.5 hours
on case); Zamora v. Zamora, 611 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no
writ) (issue of attorney's fees can be factor considered by court in making equitable division
of community estate).
507. See Austin v. Austin, 619 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1951, no writ);
Jacks v. Teague, 136 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1940, writ dism'd).
508. See Killpack v. Killpack, 616 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
509. See Navarro v. Brannon, 616 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1981, no writ). Cf. Findlay v. Cave, 611 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex. 1981) (attorney entitled to fees
incurred in collecting debts even though amount found by jury was less than demanded).
510. See Grimes v. Grimes, 612 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ). A contempt proceeding is governed by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 191 la
(Vernon Supp. 1982), which does not provide for attorney's fees.
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ment agreement requiring the husband to make monthly payments to the
wife. After the husband failed to make several of the payments, the ex-
wife brought suit in a county court at law. The husband argued that the
domestic relations court had exclusive jurisdiction of the suit because it
was a suit to enforce a settlement agreement incident to divorce. The court
of civil appeals held 51' that a suit to recover periodic support payments
under a property settlement agreement was an independent contract action
rather than a suit incident to divorce. The court that granted the divorce,
therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear the suit but has con-
current jurisdiction with other courts.512
Venue may not be maintained pursuant to section 5 of article 1995513 in
a suit for damages for breach of divorce settlement agreement when there
is no general provision within such agreement naming a particular county
as the place for performance. 514 The ordinary venue rule in favor of the
defendant applies.
In In re HillW5 5 the trial court's decree dividing the community property
was so drawn that it could not support an order for contempt. On appeal,
the appellate court found that the decree merely awarded one-half of the
husband's periodic retirement payments to his wife. 516 No order required
the husband to pay her anything and the decree failed to state when or
where the payments were to be made.517 Under the rule in Exparte Sla-
Vin 518 the appellate court held the trial court's commitment order violated
511. Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
writ ref d n.r.e.). See also Hutchings v. Bates, 406 SW.2d 419, 420 (Tex. 1966) (father's
estate liable for support payments pursuant to a property settlement agreement because con-
tract law governs the rights and obligations under such agreements).
512. 614 S.W.2d at 180. The court relied on 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 299, § 3, at 778, in
effect at the time of filing of this suit, which created the Court of Domestic Relations
Number Four that granted the divorce in this case. 614 S.W.2d at 180. The court is now the
311th Family District Court. The statute provided that the "Court of Domestic Relations
No. 4 shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the District Courts ... situated in ... [Harris]
County ... of all divorce and marriage annulment cases, including the adjustment of prop-
erty rights ... and every other matter incident to divorce." The court did not seem con-
cerned that this statute referred to district courts, when in this instance the wife filed suit in
the county court at law. See also Day v. Day, 603 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. 1980) (court grant-
ing the divorce did not have exclusive jurisdiction in a suit to enforce a judgment lien pro-
vided for in the property settlement agreement; suit was an independent action and not a
matter incident to or related to the underlying divorce).
513. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1955, § 5 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982) provides that
if a person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, ex-
pressly naming the county, or a definite place therein, suit upon, or by reason of, such obli-
gation may be brought against him in that county. For a case to come within § 5, the
contract must expressly provide for performance of the obligation in the county of suit.
Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Allen, 160 Tex. 258, 260, 328 S.W.2d 866, 867 (1959).
514. Busbey v. Busbey, 619 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1981, no
writ).
515. 611 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
516. Id. at 458.
517. Id.
518. Exparte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967) (holding that in order for a person to be
held in contempt, the decree must clearly specify the details of compliance in clear, specific
and unambiguous terms so that the person will know what duties are imposed on him).
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due process and could not stand. 519
In Ex parte Finn5 20 the trial court's order was impossible to perform
because it ordered the relator to perform an act in the past. On October 2,
during the course of a divorce proceeding, the trial court ordered the ex-
wife to deliver certain coins and other objects of precious metals to partic-
ular persons "no later than" three days before. On her failure to act the
trial court committed her to jail for criminal contempt. The appellate
court concluded that the trial court's order was clearly void and ordered
the contemnor released. 521 Although the trial judge's attorney asserted
that the contemnor had been orally ordered to do the acts recorded in the
written order several days prior to the deadline for delivery, the appellate
court found that the record did not bear out this assertion.5 22 If that fact
had been proved, some authority would have sustained the commit-
ment.5 23 The court of civil appeals also found that even if the trial court's
order had been a proper basis for a contempt proceeding, confinement was
not proper because the relator had no notice of the violation of the order
before she was held in contempt.5 24
Exparte Eureste,525 a child support case, illustrates Texas's strict adher-
ence to the notice principle of due process.5 26 In Euresie the husband
failed to make full child support payments as ordered in the divorce de-
cree. Both spouses were present at a hearing on the matter on October 2,
1980. At the hearing the judge ordered the husband to make up the arrear-
ages, set a hearing for December 15, 1980, and entered an order to that
effect on October 4, 1980. In addition the judge told the husband he would
receive no further notice of the future hearing. When the husband made
no further payments and failed to appear at the December 15 hearing he
was found in contempt of the October 4 order. The Austin court of civil
appeals reversed the contempt order because the husband Was not notified
of any violations, which could not have occurred until after October 5,
when the first payment was due. 527
In Peissel v. Peisse5 28 the former wife brought suit to accelerate pay-
ments intended to equalize community property under a divorce decree.
The decree directed payment by installments but provided for acceleration
519. 611 S.W.2d at 458-59.
520. 615 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
521. Id. at 296.
522. Id.
523. See Exparte Barnes, 581 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco, 1980).
524. 615 S.W.2d at 296.
525. 614 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
526. See Exparte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (due process requires that
the contemnor be given full and complete notification); Exparte Edgerly, 441 S.W.2d 514,
516 (Tex. 1969) (due process demands that before a court can punish for contempt, not
committed in its presence, the accused must have full and complete notification stating
when, how, and by what means the defendant is guilty of the alleged contempt); Exparte
Conway, 419 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1967) (notice is a prerequisite to the validity of a con-
temnPt order).
527. 614 S.W.2d at 648.
528. 620 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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of the entire balance if any periodic payment was more than fifteen days in
arrears. The decree also provided that payments could be abated for six
months if the husband's business was not commercially successful or he
became permanently disabled. The wife brought suit sixty days after the
first payment date was missed. The ex-husband defended on the ground
that his business had ceased at the time the suit was filed and that his
former wife was premature in the filing of her suit. The trial court
awarded the former wife the balance due, attorney's fees, and post judg-
ment interest. The appellate court held that the right to the six month
abatement was a defense to the option to accelerate but did not bar the
filing of suit.529 Because the six month abatement period had ended prior
to judgment for the wife in October, 1980, the appellate court held that
neither the filing of her suit nor the judgment against the ex-husband was
premature.5 30
In Exparte Thomas531 the trial court held the husband in contempt for
failing to make money payments to his ex-spouse to adjust the property
rights of the parties. The Houston court of civil appeals granted the con-
temnor's writ of habeas corpus concluding that he could not be held in
contempt for failing to make money payments as ordered in the original
decree, because the effect of the order was to create a debt.532 The appel-
late court found that holding a party in contempt and ordering him jailed
for nonpayment of a debt was in violation of the Texas Constitution.533 In
granting the writ, the court of civil appeals distinguished Exparte Suther-
land534 as a case in which the husband was effectively held in contempt for
failure to obey the court's order to make payment of an existing commu-
nity asset into the registry of the court.535 Thomas stands for a significant,
if small, proposition, but all the relevant facts are not set out in the opin-
ion. In order to make an equitable division of property on receipt the trial
court awarded the wife a money judgment for $16,000 and ordered the
husband to pay the wife $10,000 immediately and the balance in twelve
consecutive payments of $500 each. In addition, the trial court set aside to
the former husband his separate property, but there was no community
property available with which the husband could have discharged the obli-
gation put upon him. As an alternative the court, relying on Buchan v.
Buchan536 and Day v. Day,5 3 7 could have put an equitable lien on the
husband's separate property. On failure of the husband to make the pay-
529. Id. at 798-99.
530. Id. at 800.
531. 610 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980).
532. Id. at 214.
533. Id; see TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 18 which states: "No person shall ever be imprisoned
for a debt." Ex parte Thomas is distinguishable from a case involving an order to pay
money into the registry of the court to secure payment of the wife's share, which can result in
a contempt order for nonpayment. See Exparte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938
(Tex. 1961).
534. 515 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd).
535. 610 S.W.2d at 215.
536. 592 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd) (holding that a trial
court's imposition of an equitable lien on wife's separate homestead property to secure pay-
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ments as ordered the wife could then have foreclosed the lien. Under the
circumstances she might have reduced the husband's arrears to a money
judgment and then used the appropriate measures for collection.
Post Divorce Claims. The proceeds of life insurance policies purchased
during marriage are presumptively community property as the fruits of a
community contract.538 If during the marriage the insured spouse pur-
ports to change the beneficiary of the policy from the other spouse to an-
other person, such a change is effective for the insured spouse's share, but
it raises a question of constructive fraud as to the other spouse's share of
the proceeds.5 39 But if the spouses are divorced before there is a change
and the decree fails to dispose of the policy, then the ex-spouses become
owners of the policy as tenants in common.540 The insured may then exer-
cise his contractual right to change the beneficiary of the policy, but such
change is only effective as to the insured person's one-half interest in the
policy.54' The other ex-spouse still has an interest in the policy which is
unaffected by the insured ex-spouse's action.542 Although regular federal
civil service retirement benefits and civil service disability retirement bene-
fits 543 are subject to division and partition, compensation payments for a
post-divorce injury are not a property right to which a former spouse has
any claim.544
Retirement benefits which accrue during the marriage of the parties are
community property, but when the divorce decree fails to provide for a
division of such property, the husband and wife become tenants in com-
mon.545 A wife's suit to partition the benefits is not barred by the doctrine
ment of an award to the husband did not constitute actual divestiture of such property and
was not an abuse of discretion).
537. 610 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (divorce court justi-
fied in creating equitable lien on husband's separate property to secure payment of award to
wife.).
538. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975) states: "Property possessed by either
spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property." See
generally Pope Photo Records, Inc. v. Malone, 539 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1976, no writ) (when a husband insures his life with community funds, the right to
the insurance proceeds is community property); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d
421, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insurance purchased through the
earnings of the husband are community property).
539. See Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that a husband may property make a
gift of part of the community controlled by him, but propriety of such a gift requires absence
of fraud).
540. See Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970), Exparle Williams, 160 Tex.
314, 316, 330 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1960), Horlock v. Horlock, 614 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.), all holding that when a divorce decree
fails to provide for division of property, the husband and wife become tenants in common.
541. See Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Burke, 614 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 621 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1981) (holding that a change of
beneficiary is effective only as to the insured's community interest).
542. See 614 S.W.2d at 849.
543. Such retirement benefits are covered under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8339 (1976).
544. See Bonar v. Bonar, 614 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ refd
n.r.e.).
545. See Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); Bankston v. Taft, 612 S.W.2d
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of laches absent any repudiation of her interest in the retirement fund,546
pleading of such affirmative defense, 547 or evidence to show that the hus-
band's position had been changed in good faith because of any delay on
the part of the claimant. 548
Effects of Bankruptcy on Property Division. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978549 provides that debts "designated as alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port" are nondischargeable obligations in bankruptcy.550 In In re Nun-
naly 551 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that although
alimony after divorce is not permitted in Texas, 552 future support of a for-
mer spouse can affect a divorce court's property division so as to contain a
substantial element of "alimony-substitute," support or maintenance. 553
For purposes of applying federal bankruptcy laws, the substance of the
award, not the label a state affixes to an award, must govern. 554
Interpretation of a property settlement agreement under state law is an
important factor if the parties intended an agreement to provide for the
payment of alimony within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law.555
In In Re Teler556 the agreement provided that the former wife would con-
tinue to receive a salary from a corporation in which her husband owned a
controlling interest. That salary was held to be a nondischargeable sup-
port obligation when the husband acknowledged that the obligation was
for -her support. 557
In Ealy v. Eay 558 the husband was ordered by the divorce court to pay
216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ); Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref. n.r.e.). See also Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554
(Tex. 1970).
546. See Bankston v. Taft, 612 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no
writ).
547. See Murray v. Murray, 611 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 94 stating: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, .. laches, .. and any other matter constitut-
ing an avoidance or affirmative defense."
548. See Murray v. Murray, 611 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no
writ). See also City of Forth Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1964) (holding that
essential elements of laches are unreasonable delay by one having legal or equitable rights in
asserting them and a good faith change of position by another to his detriment because of
the delay).
549. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. 11 1978).
550. Id. § 523(a)(5)(B).
551. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
552. Id. at 1026. See Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967) (holding that "the
statutes and public policy of this state do not sanction alimony for the wife after a judgment
of divorce has been entered.").
553. 506 F.2d at 1027.
554. Id.
555. See Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981). The court stated: "The proper
test of whether the payments are alimony lies in proof of whether it was the intention of the
parties that the payments be for support rather than as a property settlement." Id. at 303.
556. 14 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
557. Id. at 436. Although the former wife had never been requested to do any work for
the corporation, eaming power of parties had been uneven, and there were minor children to
be supported. Id. at 437.
558. 616 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ dism'd).
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his ex-wife $25,000 in installments, in lieu of her interest in the parties'
home. The next year the husband was adjudged bankrupt and discharged
from the debt. The ex-wife sued to force her husband to sell the home-
stead in order to make the payments to her under the divorce decree. The
appellate court held that the husband was protected from such a forced
sale by the Texas Constitution even though the divorce court had named
the ex-husband as trustee and ordered him to pay the monthly sum for his
ex-wife's interest in the home.559 The ex-wife's difficulty could have been
avoided by the simple expedient of putting a lien on the home to secure the
payment for her interest in it.
In Erspan v. Badgett560 an ex-wife's claim to one-half of the ex-hus-
band's military retirement benefits awarded prior to the decision of Mc-
Carty v. McCart, 561 was treated as nondischargeable if the award was for
alimony substitute, support or maintenance. 562 A debtor's obligation pur-
suant to a separation agreement to pay his former spouse's attorney's fees
in connection with divorce proceedings has been held to be nondischarge-
able because it was in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
5 63
A husband's discharge can, under some circumstances, impact upon the
needs of the wife so as to constitute the change in financial condition re-
quired for a modification of a child support order.564 In a suit to increase
child support, the discharge in bankruptcy of a debt subsequent to the
original order may be considered as a factor in determining whether a ma-
terial change has occured in a father's ability to support his child.565 But a
child-support obligation assigned to a state is immediately
dischargeable.5 66
559. Id. at 422; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (defining homestead exemption). Cf.
Spence v. Spence, 455 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th dist.] 1970, writ ref.
n.r.e.) (tract that husband established as homestead was exempt from claim of former wife).
560. 647 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1981).
561. 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).
562. 647 F.2d at 555. See In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 11 (2nd Cir. 1981). See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
563. See In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding that
debtor's obligation under a separation agreement was in nature of support and nondis-
chargeable). If attorney's fees are treated as an integral part of the property division on
divorce, an award for the attorney's fees would be properly treated as discharged in bank-
ruptcy. See, e.g., Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1975).
564. In re Danley, 14 Bankr. 493, 495 (Bankr. N.M. 1981). The case dealt with New
Mexican law.
565. See Strauss v. Strauss, 619 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi, 1981, no
writ).
566. See In re Blair, 644 F.2d 69, 69 (2d Cir. 1980). By enacting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B)(Supp. II 1978) Congress intended to make a child support obligation assigned to a state
immediately dischargeable. See In re Spell, 650 F.2d 375, 376-77 (2d Cir. 1980).
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